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Chapter 1: Introduction
It is 2 a.m. when Mary Wilson’s son convinces her to go to the emergency room.1 She is
fifty-two years old, and he is concerned because she has been sick for three days. She is feverish
and nauseous, unable to keep food down, and when she reaches the emergency room, she is
having trouble breathing. The emergency department doctor who initially examines her runs
laboratory tests and diagnoses her with bacterial pneumonia. He starts her on antibiotics, and she
is admitted to the hospital. Dr. Sherry Davis, a pulmonologist, is consulted over the telephone
for initial treatment options.
Around 8 a.m. a nurse on rounds notes that Mrs. Wilson is sweating and having difficulty
breathing. Dr. Mark Thompson had taken over Mrs. Wilson’s care when he came on duty that
morning, and he is immediately paged. He finds her in respiratory distress, with a fever and
elevated heart rate and blood pressure. Dr. Thompson diagnoses her with progressing
pneumonia and impending respiratory failure. Mrs. Wilson needs to be intubated, and he
considers doing so there, but he chooses rather to transfer her to the intensive care unit (ICU).
He feels that he does not have sufficient experience with emergency intubations, and he knows
that a pulmonologist has already been assigned to Mrs. Wilson’s case.
It takes approximately fifteen minutes to organize and complete Mrs. Wilson’s transfer to
the ICU, and her respiratory distress is now more intense. Dr. Davis attempts intubation upon
her arrival in the ICU, but Mrs. Wilson goes into cardiac arrest. The physicians and nurses use a
bag-valve mask to keep Mrs. Wilson oxygenated and perform standard cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR), including two to three minutes of chest compressions and administration of
atropine and epinephrine (drugs used to speed heart rate). They then defibrillate Mrs. Wilson to
1. Story adapted from Troyen A. Brennan and Michelle M. Mello, “Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice: A Case
Study,” Annals of Internal Medicine 139 (2003): 267-273.
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restart her heart and afterwards are able to intubate her successfully. Her oxygen levels improve,
and her cardiopulmonary status stabilizes, but she has suffered severe and irreversible brain
damage from the temporary lack of oxygen.
When discharged from the hospital, Mrs. Wilson is unable to recognize her son or other
family members. She also cannot perform any activities of daily living, and she is placed in a
long-term care facility. Several months after the incident, Mrs. Wilson’s son consults an
attorney and chooses to file a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Thompson. The claim
alleges that Dr. Thompson did not seek intensive care attention for Mrs. Wilson quickly enough
and that this delay caused her cardiac arrest and subsequent brain damage.
This lawsuit against Dr. Thompson is an example of a tort claim for medical malpractice,
and there are several reasons why Mrs. Wilson’s family would want to sue. They most likely
want compensation for the costs of the injury, many of which probably will not be covered by
medical insurance. They may also want to punish the doctor for the injury they believe he has
caused. A lawsuit thus serves the purposes of compensation and punishment for the individual.
Injured patients may additionally have a desire to protect future patients in similar situations
from experiencing the same trauma that they underwent. In this sense, a medical malpractice
lawsuit not only resolves a dispute between individuals but it also serves a social purpose in
deterring future medical mistakes. Making doctors liable for the costs of injuries they cause
gives them the incentive not to be negligent when treating patients, a concept known as
deterrence. This is a form of policy-making accomplished by the courts – using lawsuits to
regulate patient safety.
In this thesis, I argue that the courts are not effective policy-makers because they are a
channel for resolving disputes between individuals. I first present the basics of medical
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malpractice litigation and some of the current literature on the courts as policy-makers. I then
address the cultural trends that have made this form of individual dispute resolution common and
acceptable, particularly for my case study of medical malpractice. Then I show how some of the
individualized aspects of the legal system distort the deterrent effect of lawsuits. I focus on the
poor fit between actual negligence and lawsuits that results in a system in which cases are
initiated by individuals. I also address the unpredictability of juries when they evaluate liability
and damages in cases. Because the decisions of courts are highly dependent on the individual
actors in individual disputes, they are not predictable and therefore cannot produce consistent
policy.
The Anatomy of Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety
Within the American common law system, a medical malpractice suit is considered a tort
for negligence. Tort law refers to the body of civil law that creates and provides remedies for
legal wrongs that are not encompassed by legal contracts. An individual who is legally injured
can sue to recover damages from someone who is liable (legally responsible) for the injury.
Although torts can be intentional acts, the concept most commonly associated with tort law is
negligence. Negligence consists of a breach of a duty of care between one person and another.
In a medical malpractice case, negligence is a breach of a doctor’s duty of care to his
patient. In order to recover damages in a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff must establish
1) that the relationship between her and the doctor gave rise to a duty, 2) that the doctor was
negligent in that his care fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable medical
practitioner, 3) that the plaintiff actually sustained an injury that was 4) proximately caused by
the doctor’s negligence. The plaintiff proves these elements using medical records and
documentation, her own testimony and that of the medical providers present, and the testimony
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of expert medical witnesses. The defendant may deny one or all elements of the negligence case,
also using documentation and the testimony of both ordinary and expert witnesses. Whereas
ordinary witnesses can only testify about the facts of the evidence, expert witnesses can provide
their opinions about the case. In a medical malpractice trial, expert witnesses typically include
doctors who practice the same kind of medicine as the defendant physician or doctors who are
experts on the particular type of injury or procedure in question. In all but rare exceptions, the
medical malpractice trial is heard by a jury, who determines the doctor’s liability as well as the
amount of damages. The damages in a negligence case can be economic, noneconomic or both.
Economic damages are the monetary costs of the injury, such as additional medical care or lost
wages. Noneconomic damages are the additional costs of an injury, such as pain and suffering or
the loss of consortium to the victim’s spouse.
In our example case, Mrs. Wilson’s attorney will need to prove to a jury that Dr.
Thompson owed her a duty of care, that Dr. Thompson’s care fell below the standard of care of a
reasonable physician, that Mrs. Wilson was in fact injured, and that this injury was caused by Dr.
Thompson’s negligence. In this case, it seems relatively certain that Dr. Thompson owed Mrs.
Wilson a duty of care as her attending physician and that Mrs. Wilson sustained an injury,
permanent brain damage. However, it is not clear whether Dr. Thompson’s decision to transfer
Mrs. Wilson to the ICU rather than intubate her himself breaches the standard of care of a
reasonable medical practitioner. If this does constitute negligence, it is also unclear whether that
decision caused her injuries or whether she would have been permanently brain damaged
regardless. Like most medical malpractice cases, the issues in Mrs. Wilson’s case are
complicated. Both sides will use Mrs. Wilson’s medical records and the testimony of Dr.
Thompson and the other physicians and nurses present to attempt to prove their respective cases.
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They will also both use expert witnesses who will testify about the standard of care in incidents
such as this one and about the causes of injuries like Mrs. Wilson’s. The jury will decide by the
weight of the evidence that each side presents whether Dr. Thompson is liable for Mrs. Wilson’s
injury and, if so, how much he should pay in damages. Economic damages for Mrs. Wilson’s
injury could include the cost of her additional hospital expenses and of the long-term care
facility. Noneconomic damages could include Mrs. Wilson’s pain and suffering and the loss to
Mrs. Wilson’s family of her presence as a mother and family member.
In theory, all civil lawsuits serve two main purposes, compensation and punishment, that
operate at both the individual and the public levels. Lawsuits provide compensation at the
individual level by reimbursing victims for the economic and noneconomic costs they face as a
result of their injury. At the public level, compensation from lawsuits prevents society at large
from having to bear the cost of an individual’s injury. For example, in medical malpractice suits,
patients who receive compensation from a lawsuit may not have to rely on tax-payer-funded
government assistance, such as Medicaid, to cover the costs of their injuries.
Lawsuits exact punishment at the individual level by providing a means of corrective
justice. Making doctors literally pay for the injuries they cause gives victims an opportunity for
retribution. At the public level, civil lawsuits do not seek to provide specific punishment but
rather to prevent future injuries by deterring people from being negligent in the first place. The
theory of deterrence says that making doctors liable for the costs of injuries they cause (including
both economic and noneconomic damages) will give them the incentive to take an appropriate
amount of precaution when treating patients. This suggests that lawsuits should function as a
public policy instrument to improve patient safety.
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Statistics on medical errors demonstrate the need for improvement in patient safety, but
there are no universal regulatory mechanisms in the United States for patient safety, leaving the
courts to be the primary means of legally regulating the doctor-patient relationship. In 1999, the
Institute of Medicine released a watershed report on patient safety, To Err Is Human. The report
extrapolated from the two largest studies on medical malpractice that between 44,000 and 98,000
Americans die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors.2 Even when using the lower
estimate, the number of deaths in hospitals due to errors exceeds the number of deaths
attributable to motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS.3 In that study, approximately 70
percent of the errors were estimated to be preventable.4 Another study of patient safety reported
that approximately one in ten hospital admissions result in an adverse event, which is defined as
an error resulting from medical care rather than a disease process.5 About half of those adverse
events were considered preventable.6 There are currently no universal systems in place for
improving these statistics. Most existing solutions are voluntary, institutional-level responses,
such as improving information technology or implementing institutional error-reporting
databanks.7 It is noteworthy that these programs address patient safety from a systems level, that
is, by making changes in institutional procedures and compiling data on trends in errors rather
than focusing on the resolution of single incidents. In this respect, they differ significantly from
medical malpractice litigation, which addresses patient safety on an individual, case-by-case
basis. Lawsuits, however, are the primary means of creating patient safety policy in the United
States by compensating past injuries and discouraging future injuries.

2. Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, eds. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan,
and Molla S. Donaldson (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 26.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 36.
5. Robert M. Wachter, Understanding Patient Safety (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008), 10.
6. Ibid.
7. See generally Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human; and Wachter, Understanding Patient Safety.
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An Introduction to Courts as Policy-Makers
The larger question that I seek to answer in this thesis is whether courts are effective
policy-makers. The answer to this question contains both a positive judgment about whether
courts are capable of making policy and a normative judgment about whether they ought to make
policy. The institutional structure and political culture in the United States have left an opening
for courts to make policy because Americans simultaneously desire government regulation and
constrained government institutions. The existing literature in this area indicates that, while the
courts can accomplish policy goals more rapidly than the legislature and can provide special
protection for minorities, they inefficiently rely on individual initiative to resolve complex issues
and arguably operate without accountability.
The American constitutional system relies on the separation of powers, and the Founding
Fathers set up a government with three branches – executive, legislative, and judicial. This was
based in large part on the English Parliamentary system, but it notably made the judicial branch
coequal to the others. The concept of an independently acting judiciary was new, and the
practice of judicial review that was solidified in Marbury v. Madison (1803) reflected America’s
independence from its English heritage. Donald Horowitz argues that the unique combination of
factors in America “sustained the creative lawmaking authority of judges.”8 In addition to the
separation of powers, the written Constitution introduced the need for judicial interpretation of
laws. The use of English common law as the basis for the court system further cemented the role
of judges as not simply arbitrators of disputes but as creators of law. Thus, the idea of courts as
policy-makers has been embedded in the American political system since its inception.

8. Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977), 2.
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The Founders who advocated the separation of powers reflected a uniquely American
distrust of government that emphasized incorporating the will of the people into the
representative system. The rhetoric of the Revolutionary War, such as the celebrated “no
taxation without representation,” fostered popular disdain for government that could act without
the approval of its citizenry. The Articles of Confederation that were adopted before the
Constitution created such a weak central government that it was unable to act independently of
the states. The separation of powers ultimately written into the Constitution ensured that there
would be checks on the power of each branch and on the legislative and executive branches in
particular.
The formation of the American governmental system, however, also coincided with what
Lawrence Friedman describes as a shift in popular expectations for “total justice,”9 a concept I
will address in greater depth in Chapter 2. These expectations emerged from a new willingness
to apportion blame and an increased ability to control nature through technology. As Americans’
expectations for the compensation of injuries increased, they expanded their notion of individual
rights, some of which had been enumerated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. These new
expectations encouraged the use of the courts as a means of obtaining restitution, and they
changed people’s expectations for government in general. People came to expect the
government to protect their newly expanded individual rights.
The current political system in America has evolved out of the tension between the
distrust of centralized government and the expectations that government will protect individual
rights. Robert Kagan states that the elements of this political system are:
“… first, a political culture (or set of popular political attitudes) that expects and
demands comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm, injustice, and
environmental dangers – and hence a powerful, activist government – and, second, a set
9. Lawrence Friedman, Total Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985).
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of governmental structures that reflect mistrust of concentrated power and hence that
limit and fragment political and governmental authority.”10
Kagan argues that contemporary Americans’ demands for insurance – for things such as health
care, natural disaster, and unemployment – are problematic in an “anti-government,”
institutionally-fragmented system like that of the United States. Government that is curtailed by
institutional limitations is incapable of providing the kinds of protections that people have come
to expect.
The combination of a generally impotent government but a markedly independent
judiciary has created an important opening for the courts to be policy-makers in the United
States, however. The legislative branch often cannot accomplish policy goals because it is
actually constrained by its responsiveness to the will of the people – interest group or
constituency pressure. The courts do not face such incentives, and so they can play a role not
only in resolving disputes between individuals and compensating victims of specific injuries, but
also in areas such as sanctioning corporations and ensuring public health and safety. These
activities make up the regulatory function of the courts, which Carl Bogus argues is in fact their
primary function. The courts do provide compensation and resolution on a case-by-case basis,
but this is only a secondary effect of using lawsuits to deter future undesirable behavior. Bogus
says, “If compensation were, in fact, one of its objectives, the system would make need a
determining factor in whether it would give parties recoveries; but that is not the case. … There
are better mechanisms for compensation. The tort system is truly about something else – it is
principally a regulatory system.”11 By determining how disputes between individuals are

10. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2001), 15.
11. Carl T. Bogus, Why Lawsuits Are Good for America: Discipline Democracy, Big Business, and the Common
Law (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 2.
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resolved and how compensation is distributed, the courts create unwritten policy about what
behaviors are acceptable and what kinds of injuries are assigned value.
Through individual conflicts expanded into class action suits, the courts have recently
become agents of social change in several key areas that have not been addressed by Congress.
Gerald Rosenberg asserts, “American courts seemingly have become important producers of
political and social change. … Further, such litigation has often occurred, and appears to have
been most successful, when the other branches of government have failed to act.”12 Rosenberg,
Bogus, and Walter Olson, among others, discuss the changes brought about by lawsuits over
tobacco, gun regulation, asbestos, and breast implants. These politically controversial cases all
relate to the need for government regulation for public health and safety, and, in all of them, the
court system ultimately determined the nature of policy. Olson argues that these cases, all of
which occurred in the latter portion of the twentieth century, were facilitated by an overall shift
in the nature of litigation. He says, “By the late 1970s, the mood and attitude in law schools had
turned around, with litigation now widely seen as an engine of social progress.”13 Changes in the
law during the same time period, which made it easier to sue and harder to defend against suit,
were compatible with the American political culture that simultaneously expects strong
government regulation and weak government institutions. The courts, therefore, have become an
acceptable source of regulation because they favor individual dispute resolution over sweeping
government intervention. They are also the only source of regulation available in situations
where the other branches of government are rendered powerless by political pressure.

12. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991), 2.
13. Walter K. Olson, The Rule of Lawyers: How the New Litigation Elite Threatens America’s Rule of Law (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 8.
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While it is evident that American courts are capable of making policy, this does not mean
that they do so effectively and therefore that they should continue to be used for that purpose.
Rosenberg calls the view that the courts do make good decisions the “Dynamic Court” model,
arguing, “Indeed, for many, part of what makes American democracy exceptional is that it
includes the world’s most powerful court system, protecting minorities and defending liberty, in
the face of opposition from the democratically elected branches.”14 In this view, the other
branches of government are not impotent but rather too powerful because their actions are
dictated by the majority to the potential detriment of the minority. The courts act as policymakers by countering the opinions of the majority, and they can do so because they are
independent of the legislative and executive branches.
Bogus makes a different argument for why the courts are appropriate makers of policy.
He writes, “The tort system, therefore, encourages effective self-regulation, that is, regulation not
by government agencies but by entities … that know their business best.”15 Bogus argues that
the justice system regulates efficiently because it eliminates the need for bureaucracy by using
the same mechanism that resolves individual disputes to force parties to self-regulate. This view
contends that the deterrent effect of lawsuits enables the courts to make unwritten policy from
within disputes and that this is more efficient than having a government agency impose policy
from without.
There is evidence, however, that the court system is actually inefficient at making policy
decisions because it is not designed to handle the complexity of many issues, because it places
the costs of regulation on the individual parties in lawsuits, because it deals in punitive rather
than regulatory methods, and because it produces unpredictable decisions due to the differences

14. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, 2.
15. Bogus, Why Lawsuits Are Good, 3.
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among judges and juries. Kagan argues, “In consequence, the American legal system often is
unjust – not, by and large, in its rules and official decisions, but because the complexity,
fearsomeness, and unpredictability of its processes often deter the assertion of meritorious legal
claims and compel the compromise of meritorious defenses.”16 Using a tool designed for
individual dispute resolution is inefficient for regulation on a large scale because it depends upon
the individuals involved to coordinate complex policy issues. I will further examine some of
these arguments against using the courts as policy-makers later in this thesis.
Part of the rationale for courts making policy is that they can act when the other branches
of government cannot. In this sense, the courts may be more effective than the legislature
because lawyers, who are not constrained by the same political and institutional checks as
legislators, may be able to “get things done.” Olson argues, however, that this defies the very
purpose of creating a system of checks and balances in the United States government:
“If just getting things done is the main priority, why then do we go to such lengths to
constrain the powers held by ‘real’ government officials? The answer, of course, is that
we do not for a moment trust those officials to wield the intimidating powers of
government office without imposing on them a high degree of transparency and
predictability, because we know how likely it is that the power would otherwise soon be
abused.”17
The distrust of government that prompted creating a system to prevent the abuse of power and
that still pervades American political culture today should resist using the branch of government
with the least amount of popular representation. W. Kip Viscusi observes the lack of
accountability in the recent lawsuits involving tobacco, guns, asbestos, and breast implants.
When this is the case, “the allocation of responsibilities for policy becomes blurred, as litigation
becomes the mechanism forcing regulatory changes. The policies that result from litigation

16. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, 4.
17. Olson, Rule of Lawyers, 312.
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almost invariably involve less public input and accountability than government regulation.”18
The government faces very little accountability when the courts create public policy, but this is
ironic because policy-making through litigation emerged because of the desire for constrained
government.
Existing literature thus shows that the use of the court system to make regulatory policy
relies on a tool for individual dispute resolution to accomplish sweeping policy changes, and it
does so without the same accountability to which the other actors in the United States
government are held. American political culture reflects a tension between desires for limited
government and the protection of expansive individual rights. The separation of powers (a
system of checks and balances on the power of government) created a judicial branch that could
act largely independent of the other branches of government. This left an opening for regulation
through the courts, which was appealing to Americans because the courts are designed to resolve
individual disputes. Americans have seized this opening in recent years to use the courts to
regulate a variety of issues.
Case Study: Medical Malpractice
This is the environment within which medical malpractice litigation exists as a regulatory
mechanism for patient safety policy. I use medical malpractice litigation as a case study for how
effectively courts can make policy because of its pertinence to political theory and because of its
prevalence. If courts are, in fact, effective policy-makers, then lawsuits should deter doctors
from making medical errors and encourage them to improve patient safety by taking an
appropriate amount of precaution.

18. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation (Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, 2002), 1.
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Medical malpractice is an excellent example of policy-making through the courts because
there are currently no other viable regulatory mechanisms in the United States. William Sage
argues that there are several reasons why malpractice has not been integrated into the health
policies enacted by Congress or state legislatures.19 First, the issue typically comes to the
forefront of debate only during periods of crisis – when malpractice insurance premiums rise –
and these crises only directly affect physicians. Furthermore, medical malpractice reform has
become entrenched in the professional rivalries between doctors and lawyers, making it
prohibitive for outsiders to interfere. Finally, the government administrative agency that has the
largest influence in formulating health policy, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
under the Department of Health and Human Services, has remained largely invisible on the topic
of medical malpractice. Patient safety policy formed through medical malpractice litigation is
thus a relevant instance in which the courts act because of the impotence of the other branches of
government.
Medical malpractice is also an important area of tort law because of the volume of cases
and the amount of money involved. There are 50,000 to 60,000 malpractice claims each year,
approximately 70% of which do not reach trial.20 About 30% of claims are closed with payment
to the plaintiff, with an average payout in 2003 between $260,000 and $310,000.21 A
Department of Justice study of the 75 most populous counties in the United States indicated that
the median award in medical malpractice cases is sixteen times higher than awards in other tort
cases.22 The immense national costs of medical malpractice demand some sort of regulation.

19. William M. Sage, “Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice,
30.
20. Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert, “The Medical Malpractice System: Structure and Performance” in
Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 13.
21. Ibid.
22. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Medical Malpractice Trials and Verdicts in Large
Counties, 2001, by Thomas H. Cohen (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, 2004).
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Preventable medical injuries in the United States are estimated to produce annual costs –
including additional acute care, long-term care, lost income, and lost household production – in
the range of $17 billion to $29 billion.23 These are injuries that litigation as a regulatory
mechanism theoretically should prevent and thus can act as a measure of how effectively the
courts enact patient safety policy.
I keep my focus in this thesis on how the nature of the legal system itself (individual
initiation of suits and the unpredictability of juries) distorts deterrence, but there are other
variables that can affect the deterrent function of lawsuits. Doctors are nearly universally
covered by liability insurance, which covers the majority of the economic costs of liability. This
has a moral hazard effect – the concept that individuals will change their behavior when they are
not forced to bear the full costs of that behavior.24 Medical malpractice insurance is also
notoriously hard to experience-rate (in the way that premiums for automobile insurance are
rated) because of variations among individual practitioners and geographic areas as well as
because of the unpredictability of lawsuits that I address in this thesis.25 At most, premiums vary
between specialties, a trend that simply places larger burdens on doctors in riskier specialties by
keeping them in small risk pools. When malpractice premiums do rise (usually across all
specialties, often because of changes in the investment market that dictates insurance companies’
profits26), doctors are able to and do pass costs along to patients through higher fees.27 There is

23. Mello and Studdert, “Medical Malpractice System,” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 13.
24. See Steven Shavell, “On Liability and Insurance,” Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982): 120-132.
25. See Frank A. Sloan, “Experience Rating: Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance?” American
Economic Review 80 (1990): 128-133.
26. See Troyen A. Brennan, Michelle M. Mello, and David M. Studdert, “Liability, Patient Safety, and Defensive
Medicine: What Does the Future Hold?” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 93-114.
27. See Patricia M. Danzon, Mark V. Pauly, and Raynard S. Kington, “The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on
Physicians’ Fees and Incomes,” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 122-127; and Mark V. Pauly, “Who Pays
When Malpractice Premiums Rise?” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 71-83.
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very little demand-side response to this because demand for healthcare is generally inelastic and
because most patients are also insured against these higher costs.
Doctors’ financial incentives have also shifted with the rise of managed care in the 1980s
and 1990s. Health management organizations (HMOs) developed in the 1980s and 1990s as a
way to control the skyrocketing costs of healthcare. They function by paying doctors a set
amount per patient (determined by the patient’s characteristics and diagnosis), which discourages
doctors from performing unnecessary medical procedures, since the cost of those procedures
comes directly out of the doctors’ paychecks. HMOs have not only strained doctor-patient
relationships (an issue that I will discuss later in a wider context) but has also changed the
incentives that doctors face.28 Doctors may choose not to perform medically necessary
procedures because of the financial strain that managed care places on them, which directly
decreases patient safety. All of these economic aspects of the healthcare industry change the
ability of lawsuits to deter future negligence, but my argument here is that the courts are
inherently inefficient policy-makers.
In my study of the effectiveness of medical malpractice litigation in deterring doctors
from injuring patients, I examine a variety of evidence about the legal culture, about those who
do and do not bring lawsuits, and about the decisions of juries. In some cases, data is available,
such as statistics about lawsuits, public opinion polls, and psychological studies. Where
quantitative research does not exist, I rely on other sources, such as cultural and medical
histories. This support from other social scientists, while not empirical, lends credibility to my
own argument and helps demonstrate the less tangible aspects of America’s legal culture.

28. See Daniel P. Kessler and Mark B. McClellan, “Malpractice Pressure, Managed Care, and Physician Behavior,”
in Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation, 183-204; and Patricia M. Danzon, “Malpractice Pressure: Comment,” in
Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation, 205-211.
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In Chapter 2, I examine medical malpractice lawsuits in light of the generally litigious
culture in the United States. The use of courts to regulate medical malpractice is part of an
overall increase in Americans’ willingness to resolve disputes by using lawsuits since the
nineteenth century. This has occurred in part because of an increase or a shift in individualism,
marked by a decline in traditional community and a decreased respect for authority. Americans
have also increasingly come to expect to be treated fairly (the notion of individual legal rights)
and to be compensated when something goes wrong. These expectations grew out of a declining
belief in divine providence and the corresponding freedom to blame other people and out of the
increasing ability of technology to control all aspects of life. The combination of individualism
and expectations for justice has made people more willing to turn to the courts, which resolve
disputes and provide compensation at the individual level. This has been particularly true in
medical malpractice because of the vast improvements of science and technology in medicine.
These have increased expectations of success in medical outcomes, creating new standards of
care, and prompting people to sue when their expectations are not met. These advances have
also changed the nature of the delivery of healthcare, making it less personal and increasing
opportunities for error, also increasing patients’ willingness to sue. The use of courts to regulate
medical malpractice has evolved out of these cultural trends of increasing individualism and
expectations for successful outcomes, but these trends also emphasize the individual nature of
the courts.
In Chapter 3, I address how the United States’ system of individually-initiated lawsuits
is incapable of sending a predictable deterrent signal to doctors. This is the problem of poor fit,
which consists of both a gap and a mismatch between patients who are negligently injured and
those who actually file malpractice lawsuits. I first examine the decision process leading from an
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injury to legal action. This incorporates the economic impact of an injury and the potential for
compensation, which are predicted more by the severity of the injury than by the presence of
negligence. This also incorporates more subjective factors like the patients’ level of anger and
willingness to sue, and these can be influenced by the characteristics of patients and doctors and
by the quality of the doctor-patient relationship. The nature of the legal system also means that
patients will pursue legal action in order to gather information about their injury or to obtain
compensation for their losses. These factors are further complicated because lawyers are often
the decision-makers in lawsuits. All of these variables are unrelated to negligence, meaning the
cases that actually reach the court system may not signal to doctors the appropriate level of care
and instances of actual negligence may go unobserved.
In Chapter 4, I examine the impact on deterrence of jury trials, which are the primary
means of deciding those cases that do reach court and which have a trickle-down effect on
whether parties choose to settle out of court, drop a case, or even file suit in the first place. The
jury decides whether a doctor is liable and, if so, the amount of monetary damages. Jurors’
decisions about liability are unpredictable in part because they are frequently influenced by
extralegal factors, such as their own background characteristics and the psychological or
emotional appeal of the parties in the case. Medical malpractice cases are also legally and
scientifically complex, increasing the unpredictability of juries. Juries’ decisions about damage
awards are highly unpredictable as well, which distorts the signal of the appropriate level of care.
While some evidence indicates that bench trials may be more accurate than jury trials, the impact
seems limited. This unpredictable nature of the courts makes them ineffective at creating largescale policy because there is no consistent deterrent signal to doctors.
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In Chapter 5, I return to the bigger picture with a concluding analysis of my medical
malpractice case study and why the courts should not be used to make policy. Medical
malpractice litigation fits into the larger cultural trend of litigiousness in America, and it
highlights the individual aspects of lawsuits that make them inappropriate policy tools. When
combined with some of the theoretical rationales against the phenomenon of adversarial
legalism, this evidence about medical malpractice shows that courts are ineffective policymakers. I also offer some brief suggestions for improvements to the system.
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Chapter 2: The American Culture of Litigiousness
People have to be willing to use the courts in order for them even to be able to make
policy. The general concept of suing for medical malpractice began to develop in the nineteenth
century, and its history corresponds to the larger trend of litigiousness in American culture.
People’s litigiousness, which I define as their propensity to sue, has increased as lawsuits have
become a socially acceptable response to injury and as their expectations for recompense have
expanded. Here I look at two aspects of the American culture of litigiousness: a strong sense of
individualism and simultaneous expectations for what Lawrence Friedman terms “total justice.”1
Individualism, or a belief in self-reliance and independence, echoes throughout American
history. Its nature has shifted, however, to focus on personal rights as communities in America
have changed from small, rural towns into large, urban centers. This shift has also contributed to
a general lack of respect for authority. The second aspect of the culture of litigiousness,
expectations for total justice, refers to people’s belief that they will be treated fairly and that
someone will pay when something goes wrong. The notion of placing blame and expecting
compensation has evolved from a declining belief in divine providence and the increasing ability
of technology to control nature. The combination of individualism and expectations for total
justice has prompted people to turn more frequently to the court system, which is a tool for
resolving disputes and providing compensation on the individual level.
The culture of litigiousness is particularly applicable to understanding the use of lawsuits
for medical malpractice because of the visible impact of cultural changes in medicine. The
scientization of medicine since the nineteenth century has greatly increased public expectations
of medical outcomes. Improvements in science and technology have created new standards of

1. Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985).
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care to which doctors are held and new expectations of perfection, prompting people to sue when
their expectations are not met. Furthermore, technological advances have depersonalized the
doctor-patient relationship, a change that has corresponded to the overall trend of individualism
and declining respect for authority. Thus people’s willingness to sue for medical malpractice
mirrors the larger trend of willingness to sue in general.
Individualism
In part, the litigiousness culture in America has resulted from the embrace of
individualism. Individualism has been at the core of American society since the country’s
founding because those who migrated to the new colonies were struggling against the
monarchical and aristocratic authority of England and other European states. The authors of the
United States Constitution relied heavily on the political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke, who emphasized a new kind of government that viewed the individual as existing prior to
society (though living a life Hobbes termed “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”).2 Society
and its government were formed through a social contract among individuals that allowed them
to maximize their individual self interest.3 This philosophy harmonized with the image of an
active citizen promoted by the Puritan and sectarian versions of Reformation Christianity that
had quickly taken hold in the new country.4 The early nineteenth century’s Western expansion,
Jacksonian democracy, and market revolution furthered the American identity of individualism,
a trend observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, who depicted Americans as always seeking their own
material gain.5

2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).
3. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (Reprint, New York: Dover,
2002).
4. Robert N. Bellah, Habits of the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 142.
5. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Reprint, London: Penguin Classics, 2003).
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The individualism that the Founding Fathers enshrined and that fueled the Western
expansion was in many ways a cooperative, communal individualism, however. It was about
self-sufficiency but within the larger community. The early settlements in America were tightly
bound by family and religious ties, and the demands of economic survival encouraged
cooperation.6 Social relationships were dominated by face-to-face, personal interactions with a
limited number of neighbors, and disputes were usually settled through some sort of arbitration,
mediation, or mutual agreement between the parties. People were expected to protect themselves
against injury and to absorb the consequences of harm should it befall them.7 Lawsuits were
considered an inappropriate means of dispute resolution because they disturbed the peace of the
community and contradicted those individualistic notions of self-sufficiency by demanding
compensation.8
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, however, there has been a shift from this
collective individualism to a personal, rights-oriented individualism. Society increasingly has
valued people as individuals with their own rights and freedoms rather than as members of a
closely-knit community. This type of individualism has flourished as traditional communities
have declined, creating the need for new forms of dispute resolution and diminishing respect for
traditional authority. Individualism has thus reduced social pressures not to sue, creating a more
litigious society.
The decline in traditional community can be measured in literal terms (a decrease in
small towns and an increase in urban areas) as well as in social and cultural terms (a rise in
dependence on strangers and a weakening of societal restraints that govern behavior).
6. Kenneth De Ville, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth Century America: Origins and Legacy (New York: New
York University Press, 1992), 116.
7. David M. Engel, “The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community,”
Law and Society Review 18 (1984): 558.
8. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 118.
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Urbanization began as the Industrial Revolution made the large-scale production of goods
possible and brought people into cities for factory jobs. This pattern continued into the twentieth
century – by 1950, 64.2% of the United States population lived in urban areas, and by 2007,
urban residents were 81.4% of the population.9 With urbanization, people are within closer
physical proximity of each other but are at a greater relational distance, which changes how
disputes are typically resolved. Relational distance is the level of intimacy between parties in a
social relationship,10 with love relationships having the greatest intimacy and the smallest
distance and interactions between strangers having the least intimacy and the greatest distance.11
People are more likely to use lawsuits to resolve disputes as the relational distance between them
increases.12 This is because law replaces other forms of social control that exist in smaller
communities (among families, friends, neighborhoods, villages, tribes, etc.).13 The Industrial
Revolution’s division of labor made these newly urban citizens extraordinarily dependent on
strangers, people with whom the relational distance was great.14 Suing for compensation for an
injury no longer implied a loss of self-sufficiency because ideas about individualism were
changing. The traditional community norms and opinions that had previously discouraged
lawsuits lost their influence as communities became larger and more heterogeneous and
interactions more anonymous.15
Urbanization and its increased relational distance are still frequently cited as an
explanation for a greater number of lawsuits per capita. For instance, in Patricia Danzon’s study

9. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision
(New York: United Nations, 2008), 80-81.
10. Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 40.
11. Robert A. Silverman and Leslie W. Kennedy, “Relational Distance and Homicide: The Role of the Stranger,”
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 78 (1987): 273.
12. Jeffery Mullis, “Medical Malpractice, Social Structure, and Social Control,” Sociological Forum 10 (1995): 152.
13. Black, Behavior of Law, 6.
14. Friedman, Total Justice, 40.
15. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 119.
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of malpractice lawsuits in California in the 1970s, she found that urbanization was the most
significant and most powerful predictor of frequency of claims, even after controlling for the
increased density of medical services in urban areas.16 In a 1987 survey of Florida tort lawyers,
75.8% of attorneys indicated that more impersonal relationships between claimants and potential
defendants, such as doctors or manufacturers, were a reason for increased litigation in the state.17
Another study from the mid-1980s looked at the effect of relational distance on court cases in
Sander County, Illinois, a rural county that had recently started to modernize, bringing in new
people and increased interactions with people outside the local community. The members of the
community had a strong aversion to personal injury cases, but those cases that were filed
generally involved parties separated by geographic or social distance.18 The increased distance
prevented traditional conflict resolution processes from functioning. All three of these latetwentieth century studies show that the decline in traditional communities has increased the
acceptability of lawsuits to resolve disputes.
Another component of individualism that has increased since the middle of the twentieth
century is a diminished respect for traditional forms of authority, making people more willing to
confront authority figures and creating a need for the courts as an external arbiter of disputes.
Authority in its traditional sense indicates a certain status or quality that compels trust and
obedience.19 A crisis in authority is characterized by a breakdown in the traditional mechanics of
social control, by widespread protest against many different forms of authority, and by increased

16. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims (Institute for Civil Justice.
Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1982), 27.
17. Donald G. Gifford and David J. Nye, “Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a Growth State,” University of
Florida Law Review 4 (1987): 869.
18. Engel, “Oven Bird’s Song,” 567.
19. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 9.
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radical sentiment.20 The period starting in the 1960s plunged the United States (and the entire
Western world) into just such a crisis, as people sensed a gap between the promise and the
performance of the institutions in which they placed their trust.21 This was the time of the antiVietnam War movement as well as the decline of the Catholic Church’s authority and the student
protests in Europe.22 During this period, Americans became extremely distrustful of the leaders
of all their major institutions. Between just 1966 and 1971, the percentage of the public
expressing a great deal of confidence in the leaders of ten different institutions declined by 20
points on average in Harris polls.23 Then, from 1981 to 1990, the World Values survey indicated
that an emphasis on respect of authority was becoming less and less widespread.24 This shift
away from authority was also a shift toward personal individualism, and Americans became
willing to assert their own authority as individuals.25 This made them more willing to use the
courts, which are a device for resolving individual conflicts, to assert their rights and to demand
compensation for wrongs.
Expectations for Total Justice
Just as increased individualism in the United States has removed the social constraints
against suing others, Americans have also come to expect “total justice.” This is the sense that
everyone should be treated fairly and that people can expect compensation if they are not treated
fairly.26 Expectations for total justice reflect the relatively new concept of an individual right as
something that can be sued over if expectations are not met, as seen in the rights movements of
20. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the
Public Mind (New York: Free Press, 1983), 1.
21. Ibid.
22. Eric J. Cassell, “The Changing Concept of the Ideal Physician,” Daedalus 115, no. 2 (1986): 195.
23. Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, 42.
24. Ronald Inglehart, “Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority,” in Nye, Zelikow, and
King, Why People Don’t Trust Government, 222.
25. Ibid., 221.
26. Friedman, Total Justice, 5.
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the twentieth century. This notion has been developing since the nineteenth century as people’s
belief in divine providence declined and their belief in the ability for humans to control the
environment increased, particularly because of constantly improving technology. These changes
in the social environment have changed the “legal culture”27 of America, making people more
willing to use lawsuits to rectify perceived wrongs.
The “due process” revolution of the mid-twentieth century was an indicator of
Americans’ increasing expectations for justice.28 The civil rights movement of the 1960s was
followed in the 1970s by movements advocating the rights of women, children, prisoners,
students, and a multitude of other minority groups.29 The 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the
consumer movement, which changed economic culture with its focus on buyers’ rights and
sellers’ obligations.30 As individuals took these demands for rights to court, they blurred the
boundaries between public and private law.31 As the courts acknowledged these perceived
rights, they also raised people’s expectations of what normal levels of justice ought to be32 and
increased their demands on the legal system.33 The rights revolution of the twentieth century,
however, was fueled by the cultural changes starting in the nineteenth century that also increased
people’s expectations for justice: a declining belief in divine providence and an increase in
technology.
During the nineteenth century, the American religious environment was marked by a
waning belief in divine providence but an increasing belief in the attainability of human
27. Ibid., 31.
28. Ibid., 80.
29. Starr, Social Transformation, 388.
30. Marie R. Haug and Bebe Lavin, “Public Challenge of Physician Authority,” Medical Care 17 (1979): 844; Leo
G. Reeder, “The Patient-Client as a Consumer: Some Observations on the Changing Professional-Client
Relationship,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 13 (1972): 408.
31. Friedman, Total Justice, 91.
32. Jane Mansbridge, “Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government,” in Nye, Zelikow, and
King, Why People Don’t Trust Government, 144.
33. Friedman, Total Justice, 80.
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perfection, shifting blame for misfortune from God to other humans. Traditional providence
theory reflected the belief that God created the world and continuously sustained it and that
nothing occurred by mere chance.34 The proper response to misfortune was humble acceptance
because it was an act of God.35 This response was not entirely unfounded because the majority
of misfortunes before the nineteenth century were naturally caused – storms, fires, disease,
famine36 – and there were no human actors to blame. However, American society gradually
secularized, beginning in northern cities following the American Revolution, and people shifted
away from a providential or fatalistic viewpoint.37 By the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Unitarians, deists, and various liberal Protestant clergymen were directly attacking the notion of
direct providential intervention.38 One indication that this was the case was the growth of
insurance companies during the nineteenth century. These companies reimbursed losses for
catastrophic events, and their prevalence reflects the notion that people no longer passively chose
to accept misfortune.39 When God was no longer to blame for misfortune, people were freed to
locate human agents on whom to place blame.40 Providence theory was replaced by a Romantic
belief in the ability to perfect the individual and society41 and by a belief in the perpetual
progress of the human race.42 These ideas were compatible with the new emphasis on individual
rights and the greater dependence on strangers, and Americans turned more and more to using
lawsuits to demand compensation from others for the misfortunes that befell them.

34. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 120.
35. Ibid., 22.
36. Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 10.
37. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 120.
38. Ibid., 121.
39. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 121; Friedman, Total Justice, 49.
40. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 22.
41. Ibid., 125.
42. Kenneth De Ville, “Medical Malpractice in Twentieth Century United States,” International Journal of
Technology Assessment in Health Care 14 (1998): 201.
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The increased willingness to blame others for unmet expectations was compounded by
higher expectations as improved technology increased people’s ability to control their
environment. Science and technology were crucial in generating the notion that humans could
control nature.43 The huge advances in transportation, industry and the physical sciences during
the nineteenth century transformed the relationship between humans and nature, and humans felt
a new power over their destiny as they transcended the previous limits of their environment.44
People felt like they and their world could be perfected, and this new sense of physical control
created a new demand for social control.45 If human technology could control the risk present in
the environment, then people wanted compensation from other humans when things did not go
right. Tort cases increased during the nineteenth century because technology converted natural
risk into liability for the humans who created or provided the technology.46 Improved
technology thus increased people’s expectations for justice and, when combined with the spirit of
individualism, increased their willingness to sue if those expectations were not met.
The Litigious Culture and Medical Malpractice
The trends that have made America more litigious over the past two centuries – increased
individualism and greater expectations for justice – have been particularly evident in people’s
willingness to sue for medical malpractice. The modern emphasis on individual rights has
manifested in the patients’ rights movement and a decreased respect for doctors as authority
figures. Furthermore, the scientization of medicine and the influx of technology have increased

43. Friedman, Total Justice, 42.
44. De Ville, Nineteenth Century, 109.
45. Friedman, Total Justice, 51.
46. Mark F. Grady, “Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical
Malpractice Explosion,” Northwestern University Law Review 82 (1988): 297.

28

patients’ expectations of success while simultaneously fundamentally changing the delivery of
medicine so that it does not always align with those expectations.
The relationship between doctors and patients has changed over the past century because
of the patients’ rights movement, which reflects people’s increased emphasis on individual
rights, decreased respect for authority, and increased expectations for justice. The patients’
rights movement emerged as part of the larger consumer movement of the 1960s,47 and it
emphasized both the right to access healthcare and rights within healthcare (such as informed
consent, refusal of treatment, and access to medical records).48 The movement was a direct
challenge to the traditional authority of physicians because it demanded that patients be able to
participate in their own treatment decisions as knowledgeable partners.49 Previous attempts to
reform healthcare, such as those implemented during the Progressive Era, had assumed that
physicians would act in the best interests of their dependent patients, but by the 1970s,
Americans were skeptical of professional authority and its institutions.50 While people’s
confidence in medicine was generally higher than in other institutions, the percentage of
respondents to Harris polls indicating a “great deal of confidence” in the leaders of medicine
dropped from an average of 66% in the mid-1960s to an average of only 41% in the late 1970s.51
One of the most recent Harris polls, conducted in February 2008, found that only 28% of
respondents felt a “great deal of confidence” in the leaders of the medical institution.52 Patients
no longer feel a sense of loyalty, commitment or trust around their doctors, and this mirrors the

47. Mullis, “Medical Malpractice,” 150.
48. Starr, Social Transformation, 389.
49. Ibid.,390.
50. Ibid.
51. Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, 48-49.
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overall decline in respect for authority in America.53 The patients’ rights movement and the
diminished respect for authority in medicine parallel the larger shift towards individual rights in
America, and these have thus increased the willingness of patients to sue their healthcare
providers for medical malpractice.
This notion of health and healthcare as rights rather than as privileges or chance
occurrences is also connected to the scientization of medicine and introduction of new medical
technology, both of which have increased expectations for success.54 The marriage of science
and medicine first occurred in the early nineteenth century, when Paris physicians began
correlating clinical observations with pathological lab results.55 The discoveries of Louis
Pasteur, Robert Koch, and others demonstrated the practical abilities of science to diagnose and
prevent diseases.56 Around the same time, Ignaz Semmelweis and Oliver Wendell Holmes
demonstrated that physicians could prevent obstetrical infection by washing their hands, greatly
reducing the number of maternal deaths and making hospitals a safe place for childbirth.57 The
first uses of ether as anesthesia in 1842 suddenly made possible surgeries previously thought
impossible or extremely dangerous.58 Similarly, new technology allowed for improved
diagnostics and improved treatments. For example, the 1830s saw a revolution in orthopedics
with new techniques and methods of setting bones, allowing for complete recovery from simple
fractures.59 People came to view the treatment of fractures as a mechanical procedure that could
produce perfect results every time. At the start of the twentieth century, x-rays also became an
important and nearly universal tool for diagnosing fractures and other maladies. Science and
53. Cassell, “Ideal Physician,” 187, 197.
54. Renée C. Fox, “The Medicalization and Demedicalization of American Society,” Daedalus 106, no. 1 (1977):
10.
55. Cassell, “Ideal Physician,” 189.
56. Leighton E. Cluff, “America’s Romance with Medicine and Medical Science,” Daedalus 115, no. 2 (1986): 137.
57. Ibid., 138.
58. Ibid.
59. De Ville, “Twentieth Century,” 200.
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technology thus brought new successes to medicine by improving physicians’ understanding of
the body and diseases and their ability to diagnose and treat patients.
These successes demonstrated to the public the power of science in the medical world,
thereby increasing people’s expectations of medicine, and higher expectations have made people
more likely to sue for malpractice when those expectations are not met. Technology has a life
cycle with regard to litigation. There is an initial technological advance, which leads to inflated
expectations for success and then to litigation when those expectations are not met.60 In part this
is because patients do not always understand the risks inherent in technology, and they expect
perfect results every time.61 This cycle continues as improvements in care constantly raise both
the expectations of patients (creating a technological imperative62), and the standard of care to
which future doctors are held.63 For instance, the improvements in orthopedics meant that the
number of lawsuits related to poorly healed fractures increased,64 and the acceptance of x-rays as
a diagnostic tool also prompted their acceptance as evidence and as the standard of care in
malpractice lawsuits.65 Technology has thus transformed natural risk into potential liability for
doctors.66
Science and technology have also changed the very organization of the medical
institution, which has also increased patients’ willingness to sue. During the nineteenth century,
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the study of medicine came to focus on anatomy.67 Hospitals became the locus of treatment
because they could coordinate patients with technology and personnel.68 However, these
changes channeled much of the communication between doctors and patients through
mechanical mediums, ranging from stethoscopes to MRIs, which have gradually eliminated
many of the personal elements from the doctor-patient relationship.69 Furthermore, increased
science and technology have led more doctors to work as specialists rather than as general
practitioners, and so patients will often see a given doctor for only brief and impersonal
interactions. In 1928, general practitioners accounted for about 88% of the physician population
in the United States, but by 1970 they accounted for only 17%.70 This fragmentation of the
healthcare system has created a structure highly conducive to litigation because it has increased
the relational distance between doctors and patients, making patients more willing to sue.71
Specialization also means that a larger number of healthcare providers are involved in any one
patient’s care, increasing the number of opportunities for error while further eroding the doctorpatient relationship.72 The influx of science and technology since the nineteenth century has thus
altered the entire structure of the medical institution, making doctors easily susceptible to
lawsuits from patients.
The trends in medical malpractice lawsuits can be viewed within the larger cultural
framework of litigiousness in the United States. The combination of individualism and
expectations for total justice has made Americans more likely to turn to lawsuits to resolve
disputes. This has been especially true in the medical institution because of the changes that
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science and technology have wrought on patients’ expectations and the nature of the doctorpatient relationship. This framework helps to identify why Americans have chosen to use the
courts to create patient safety policy, but it also hints at why the courts are largely inefficient at
such. Americans turned to lawsuits because they are a means of individual dispute resolution,
making them appealing in an individualist society expecting justice and compensation for
injuries. However, the individual nature of lawsuits means they do not necessarily make
predictable policy, as I show in the next chapters.
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Chapter 3: The Poor Fit Phenomenon
One aspect of lawsuits that makes them appealing in a culture that expects compensation
for violations of individual rights is that they are initiated by individuals. However, this detracts
from the courts’ ability to make patient safety policy efficiently because lawsuits will not send a
complete deterrent signal to doctors. This is because of the poor fit between patients who are
negligently injured and those who actually file malpractice lawsuits. There are a vast number of
negligent injuries that do not result in lawsuits, but many of the lawsuits that are filed do not
result from negligent injuries. In order to determine what causes this poor fit between
malpractice incidents and malpractice lawsuits, I first look at the decision process leading from
an injury to legal action. The decision to sue incorporates the economic impact of the injury and
the potential for compensation, but it also takes into account anger and reluctance to sue. The
first two factors are best estimated by the severity of the injury, which can change whether
patients seek legal action regardless of the cause of the injury. The second two factors are
evaluated even less objectively, and they can be influenced by the characteristics of patients and
by the quality of doctor-patient relationships. The nature of the legal system also changes these
variables for patients, and they may pursue legal action because they lack other means of
obtaining information about their injury or compensation for their losses. Ultimately, lawyers
frequently determine which cases will proceed to trial, and they also make decisions based on
criteria other than doctors’ negligence.
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Defining Poor Fit
Poor fit can be defined as the simultaneous “gap” between potential and actual
malpractice claims and the “mismatch” between actual negligence and actual claims.1 There are
several large-scale studies of malpractice that document this phenomenon, which I describe
below. Generally, tort reform proposals address the latter issue (in the spirit of reducing
“frivolous” lawsuits) by making it more difficult to pursue a lawsuit or limiting the amount of
compensation that plaintiff may recover. The first issue, which reveals that there are far more
incidents of medical malpractice than surface in the legal system, is frequently washed over
because of its terrifying implications. However, this overall phenomenon of poor fit indicates
that lawsuits are not effectively improving patient safety.
One of the initial studies of medical injuries was sponsored by the California Medical
Association in the mid-1970s. The study had nurses and physicians review nearly 21,000
medical records in 21 California hospitals, identify those patients who had suffered an adverse
event, and evaluate the likelihood of a jury finding liability. The reviewers found that 4.65% of
people hospitalized had suffered an adverse event, while 0.79% suffered an adverse event for
which they would likely be found liable.2 In 1985, Patricia Danzon did a follow-up to this study
in which she matched the California hospital data with malpractice claims data from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ survey of claims closed by private insurers from July
1975 to December 1978. Danzon found that only 10% of victims of negligent injuries filed a
malpractice claim and that only 40% of these claims resulted in payment to the plaintiff.3 The
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overall ratio of paid claims to injuries was 0.039, meaning a physician who committed an error
leading to injury had only a 4% chance of having to compensate the patient.4 The California
study and its follow-up thus demonstrated the large gap between the number of negligent injuries
and the claims filed, but its results were limited in that Danzon could not determine the
percentage of claims that did not involve negligence (the mismatch).
Later that decade, researchers in New York created the largest and most complete study
of medical malpractice, the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS).5 The HMPS was modeled
after the California study, and it entailed a review of more than 30,000 medical records for
patients hospitalized in New York and more than 67,000 litigation records maintained by the
New York Department of Health. Physicians completed in-depth reviews of 3,500 claims. The
study determined that 3.7% of New Yorkers suffered adverse events, and 1% suffered adverse
events due to negligence.6 The researchers found that the ratio of negligent adverse events to
malpractice claims was 7.6 to 1, or about a 14% chance that a negligent injury would lead to a
claim.7 This figure overstated the actual chance, however, which they estimated was only
1.53%.8 These numbers indicate both a gap in the number of negligent adverse events and the
number of malpractice claims and a mismatch between negligent events and claims.
A third study demonstrating poor fit was conducted by a subgroup of the HMPS
investigators in the early 1990s. They examined rates of medical injuries and negligence for
nearly 15,000 medical records in Utah and Colorado, finding that adverse events occurred in
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2.9% of hospitalizations in each state.9 In Utah, 32.6% of adverse events were due to
negligence, and in Colorado, 27.4% were due to negligence.10 However, only 2.5% of the
patients injured because of negligence filed a malpractice claim.11 Furthermore, out of the
eighteen claims filed from the study sample, fourteen were made in the absence of discernible
negligence and ten were made in the absence of any adverse event.12 The Colorado and Utah
study confirmed the results of the HMPS in a different area of the country, suggesting the
prevalence of the poor fit phenomenon.
From Injury to Lawsuit
In order to understand what causes the gap and the mismatch between negligent injuries
and malpractice claims, it is important to understand how patients make the decision to pursue
legal action. There are several transformations in a patient’s perceptions of events that lead from
the injury to the decision to engage in a legal dispute, and there are also alternatives to legal
action. Economics suggests that a patient’s decision to go to trial should be based on the
expected value of the verdict and legal costs, but the statistics about poor fit suggest that there
are other factors that determine which cases progress to lawsuits.
The movement from injury to legal action consists of three stages: perception or
recognition of a grievance; legal reaction to the grievance (including the decision to seek legal
advice, the attorney’s actual advice, and the decision to pursue legal action); and disposition of
the dispute in settlement or trial.13 The third stage of the process is distinct from the others in
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10. Ibid.
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that its outcome relies on the external actors of the legal system, and I discuss the
unpredictability of this stage in Chapter 4. The outcomes of the first two stages, however,
explain how cases even reach the legal system, and these stages are where the poor fit between
negligence and malpractice lawsuits will manifest.
Before an individual considers legal reaction to a situation, the experience must develop
into a dispute. An experience of an injury progresses to a grievance and finally to a dispute
through particular stages of processing, which can be viewed as transformations in the injured
individual’s understanding.14 The first transformation is the recognition that a particular
experience has been injurious, and this is called naming.15 The naming of injuries is the hardest
part of the process to study empirically, but the prevalence of naming is mirrored by the culture
of litigiousness that I described in Chapter 2. The next transformation is blaming, which occurs
when a person turns a perceived injury into a grievance by attributing it to the fault of another
individual (or social entity).16 A grievance is specifically a complaint against someone or
something, rather than a general complaint against no one in particular. The injured person must
also believe that something should be done in response to the injury. Blaming is the most
indicative transformation because, on average, a person who blames another for an injury is 4.4
times more likely to sue than one who does not place blame.17 The final transformation,
claiming occurs when someone with a grievance voices it to the person believed to be
responsible and asks for a remedy.18 The grievance will evolve into a dispute if it is rejected,
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16. Ibid.
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either in whole or in part, through delay, partial rejection or outright refusal.19 The path from an
adverse medical experience to a dispute with a doctor thus requires three distinct transformations
in the perception of the patient as well as the rejection of the patient’s claim by the doctor.
The movement from injury into legal action can be waylaid at any point if individuals do
complete any one transformation along this path, and the seeking of legal advice is only one
option faced by injured patients.20 Some individuals will choose to lump it and do nothing about
their injury. Others will exit the situation by changing doctors and therefore avoid the problem.
Furthermore, when individuals reach the claiming transformation, they may choose to confront
their doctor directly, to complain to a non-legal third party forum (such as a hospital review
board), or to go to a lawyer for advice.
The decision to seek legal advice can be influenced by an individual’s audience, the
people to whom the patient turns to tell his or her story, to seek advice, and to formulate a
response to the experience. The audience may consist of family, friends, other acquaintances, or
more knowledgeable people, and the conversation with the audience is primarily casual.21
Audiences serve as “brokers” or “middlemen” by helping patients define and process the
transformations from experience to legal dispute.22 They may discourage complaints and
convince a patient that there is no real grievance or that nothing can be done about it. On the
contrary, they may persuade the patient to voice a complaint in a legal or non-legal forum.

19. Ibid., 636.
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Those who ultimately seek legal advice make active use of audiences, while audiences have less
influence on those who take informal action.23
If individuals do seek legal advice, they must make a choice about whether ultimately to
pursue a lawsuit. A simple economic model shows how a plaintiff would rationally make this
decision in a situation where all other factors were equal. In our American legal system, in
which each party is responsible for his or her own legal costs, the plaintiff will bring suit if and
only if the expected judgment would be at least as large as the legal costs.24 The parties in this
model are risk-neutral, meaning they base their decision on the expected value of the verdict (the
amount of damages multiplied by the probability of winning the case). However, the model can
be adjusted to consider risk-averse parties, who value a scenario with a lower but more certain
expected value more than one with a higher but less probable expected value. Factoring in risk
aversion would reduce a plaintiff’s willingness to bring suit because going to trial involves
uncertainty.25
Risk aversion, however, explains only a small portion of the extremely low rate of claims
(1 claim for every 7.6 negligent events), suggesting that preferences other than simply
maximizing the expected value of compensation are part of the lawsuit-filing equation. The
basic economics also do not explain the mismatch of poor fit—why patients who are not injured
by negligence choose to file lawsuits. Determining the source of poor fit, or even explaining
legal disputes in general, is difficult because the path from injury to legal action is far more
complicated than these simple models suggest. Injurious behaviors are often ambiguous; norms
and standards of care are uncertain for patients; memories, especially of traumatic events, are
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24. Steven Shavell, “Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs,” Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1982): 58.
25. Ibid., 61.

40

faulty and emotions change; the parties involved may have conflicting objectives and values; and
the entire legal system is complex, particularly for one-time players.26 Therefore, a fuller
equation for a patient’s decision to pursue legal action will be a function of not only the
economic impact (income loss, legal expenses, etc.) and the potential compensation but also the
patient’s level of anger and the patient’s general reluctance to sue.27 A patient will seek legal
action if the sum of the economic impact, potential compensation, and anger exceed any
reluctance to sue.28
The economic impact and potential compensation for an injury may be difficult for
patients to estimate, but one factor that patients take into account is the severity of the injury.
More severe injuries likely create a larger economic burden on patients and prompt larger awards
from juries. Therefore, patients are more likely to seek legal counsel and to sue if their injuries
are more serious, regardless of whether the injuries were caused by negligence.29 One group of
researchers used a household survey and interviews conducted by the RAND Institute about
injuries. They found that the severity of injury, as measured by either perceived or actual
damage sustained during an accident, was positively related to the claiming rate.30 The predicted
claiming rate is 35% for serious injuries (life-threatening or long-term), but only 16% for
moderate injuries and 12% for minor injuries.31 Similarly, measuring severity of injury in terms
of days of work missed was also positively related to the claim rate.32 Severity of injury, while
certainly important to the victim of an injury, may be entirely unrelated to whether the injury was
negligently caused. Thus, patients with less severe but negligent injuries may not pursue legal
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action, while those with more severe injuries not caused by negligence may inappropriately file
lawsuits. This may explain some of the mismatch between incidents of negligence and actual
claims filed.
The other two variables in the patient decision to pursue legal action, anger and
reluctance to sue, are even less predictable than the economic impact and potential compensation
because they are dependent on the individual characteristics of a given doctor-patient
relationship and on the idiosyncrasies of the legal system. Changes in these elements may make
patients more or less willing to sue, regardless of the presence of negligence, leading to the poor
fit phenomenon. Because these factors are not dependent on negligence in a case, they detract
from the ability of lawsuits to deter doctors from committing future negligence.
Patient and Physician Characteristics and Relationships
There are several factors that may affect patients’ level of anger or reluctance to sue and
thus the likelihood that they will file a lawsuit. These include individual patient characteristics,
such as income and social status, or individual physician characteristics, such as country of
origin. However, one of the largest determinants of patients’ willingness to sue is the quality of
the doctor-patient relationship both before and after adverse events. This large impact of how
patients perceive physician behavior also warrants a brief examination of disclosure programs
and their impact on patients’ willingness to take a dispute to court.
When considering the characteristics of individual patients, there are interacting effects of
income and social status that make patients more or less likely to sue independent of a negligent
injury. Generally, low-income, working class individuals are less likely to file suits. Lower
income would seem to suggest that the economic impact of a medical injury and the utility value
of potential compensation would be greater, but the effect of income level is more complex.
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Financial issues are important to patients who are considering lawsuits. One analysis of
approximately 500 prospective client phone calls to two malpractice law firms found that 48% of
potential plaintiffs specifically mentioned difficulties with finances in their complaint.33
Furthermore, 45% of the potential plaintiffs with earned income had outstanding medical bills,
one third of which were 50% or more of the individual’s earned income.34 Even more of the
potential plaintiffs without earned income (66%) had outstanding medical bills.35 However, the
odds that a plaintiff was poor in the HMPS were only 1 in 5.36 Likewise, the researchers in the
Utah and Colorado study found that those who did not file claims were 6.3 times more likely to
be low-income earners than those who did.37 Low income only seems to increase the likelihood
of suing if a plaintiff is unemployed. The study of phone calls to law firms found that the
unemployment rate for potential plaintiffs was more than three times that for the general
population in the area.38 Another study compared 200 patients who filed a malpractice or
negligence claim against a large urban teaching hospital and its physicians with a random sample
of 549 patients who had never filed a claim against the hospital. In proportion to their
representation in the control group, blue-collar workers brought far fewer claims than either
white-collar or retired/unemployed workers.39 While this study considered employment status
rather than income level, it suggests similarly that low-income earners (as opposed to those with
no earned income) are much less likely to bring suit against a doctor.
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Other socially marginalized groups, including the elderly and minorities, are also
reluctant to sue. The HMPS researchers found that the elderly were 5 times less likely to sue
than others.40 Another study surveyed trial attorneys about their perceptions of the effects of
various characteristics on patients’ willingness to sue. Among the responses, the aged were
perceived to have a high unwillingness to sue.41 This pattern among the elderly may reflect a
judgment that the potential compensation for an elderly individual is lower than for a younger
person, but it also reveals a definite reluctance to sue on the part of the elderly. The same study
found that minorities and foreign-born patients were also perceived as slightly unwilling to sue.42
The study of claims against the teaching hospital indicated that whites filed significantly more
claims than nonwhites, suggesting a reluctance to sue among minorities.43
All three of these populations (low-income earners, the elderly, and minorities) have a
low social status, which may increase their reluctance to sue. Status is particularly important
when considering medical malpractice lawsuits because the professional/client status differential
has great significance in doctor-patient relationships.44 The wide availability to patients of
medical information in print and online sources has made patients more knowledgeable partners
in their interactions with doctors, and patients’ rights have come to the forefront of healthcare
debate since the middle of the twentieth century. However, patients, especially those in
traditionally low-status social groups, do still relate to their doctors as authority figures.45
Importantly, patients with less knowledge about the work of health and legal professionals are
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less likely to sue.46 The members of low-status populations are often more accepting of
authority, less adversarial, and less secure in using the legal system.47 Therefore, patients in
these groups will be less likely to file suit, regardless of the presence of negligence, and this
accounts for some of the gap portion of poor fit.
The characteristics of the doctor involved in a dispute can also influence a patient’s
willingness to sue. Traits such as age, sex, education, or country of origin are important because
these are how patients judge a doctor’s “worthiness” or “merit.”48 The survey of attorneys’
perceptions found that patients were more willing to file suit in cases where the physician was
born or trained in a non-English speaking country.49 Patients were also slightly more willing to
sue doctors who were specialists or seen on referral, doctors lacking board certification, and
doctors practicing as salaried employees.50 All of these characteristics suggest that patients are
more willing to sue doctors with whom they are unfamiliar, either culturally or professionally,
regardless of the presence of negligence.
Familiarity is an important component of the doctor-patient relationship, and the quality
of this relationship is an important determinant of both the patient’s willingness to sue and the
patient’s relative level of anger after an adverse event. Patients’ evaluations of doctors typically
consist of two general components: communication and behavior. These both must be very
satisfactory in the case of unfamiliar doctors in order to prevent a strong negative response when
an adverse event occurs.51 There is ample evidence to demonstrate the importance of these
components both before and after an adverse event.
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The behavior and communication patterns of doctors prior to adverse events determine
whether patients evaluate experiences as grievances and whether they ultimately pursue legal
action. A study of four patient focus groups in Colorado revealed that the perceived level of
communication between patients and health care providers determined whether patients
continued those relationships and whether they defined an event as a “mistake” or as
“malpractice.”52 The analysis of phone calls made to law firms found that 53% of potential
plaintiffs complained, often angrily, of a poor relationship with their health care provider prior to
the adverse event.53 Patients who more negatively evaluate a doctor’s behavior (i.e. competence)
or who feel that their doctors do not show personal concern for them, even before a grievance
develops, are more likely to pursue legal action.54 Similarly, the survey of attorneys showed that
the variables that significantly reduced patients’ willingness to sue were based on the prior
doctor-patient relationship and good communication.55 Another study that examined the patient
records of over 600 physicians over several years in the 1990s found that the risk of lawsuit was
directly related to patients’ level of dissatisfaction with their physicians’ ability to establish
rapport, provide easy access, and communicate effectively.56 Finally, a group of obstetric
patients surveyed about their response to a hypothetical adverse event scenario showed increased
perceptions of competence, decreased perceptions of physician responsibility for the adverse
outcome, and fewer expressed intentions to file malpractice claims because of positive doctorpatient relations.57
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After an adverse event occurs, whether or not it was caused by negligence, the level and
quality of communication becomes especially important in determining a patient’s willingness to
sue, and disclosure programs may be able to impact whether a patient chooses to file suit. A
survey of over 200 patients who had chosen to pursue legal action revealed frequent complaints
about a lack of clear, sympathetic explanations by doctors and a corresponding lack of
recognition of the importance of patients’ emotional needs apart from their physical needs.58
The patients in the survey tended to blame their doctors more for the lack of openness or
willingness to explain than for the original mistakes.59 Another study, using 13 patient-physician
focus groups in St. Louis, found that patients believed that the way an error was disclosed to
them directly affected their emotional experience and that they would be less upset if the
physician disclosed the error honestly and compassionately.60 The physicians in the focus
groups, however, reported feeling the need to choose their words carefully when discussing
errors with patients.61 Hospitals, insurers, and attorneys frequently advise physicians to avoid
trigger words such as “error,” “harm,” “fault,” or “mistake” when talking to patients, but patients
often then perceive their doctors as impersonal or uncaring.62 These surveys reveal that patients’
level of anger may increase and their reluctance to sue may decrease if they do not feel their
doctors are communicating clearly and compassionately. This makes patients more likely to take
a case to trial regardless of the presence of negligence, accounting for the mismatch portion of
poor fit.
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This discussion of communication following adverse events leads naturally to a brief
discussion of disclosure policies. Health care providers (and their liability insurance companies)
use disclosure as a risk management tool in the belief that at least some patients who would have
sued their doctors will not do so if they receive an early and candid explanation of the event.63
They will come to understand that their injuries were not caused by negligence, will feel less
angry with their doctors, or some combination of the two.64 One of the best-known disclosure
programs is the “3Rs” program at COPIC, a liability insurer directed by physicians in
Colorado.65 The program links improved doctor-patient communication with up to $30,000 in
compensation. It is “no-fault” in that it does not tie compensation to negligence, and it also does
not preclude a patient’s right to sue. As of 2007, the 3Rs had handled more than 3000 events,
approximately one quarter of which received payments averaging $5400 each.66 There were
only 23 cases subsequently resulting in litigation; the patient had received 3Rs payment in only 7
of those cases, and only 2 resulted in additional tort payments.67
Although there seems to be some ability to limit some patients’ willingness to sue
through disclosure programs, they also run the risk of making other patients aware of their
injuries and encouraging litigation that would not otherwise have occurred. The success of
disclosure programs rests in the net impact of size and costs between these two effects.68 A
group of experts (physicians and lawyers) were asked to evaluate the data from the HMPS and
the Utah and Colorado study to determine the potential effects of a disclosure program. They
predicted that disclosure would on average deter 32% of patients from suing and prompt new
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claims from 31% of patients.69 However, among patients whose injuries were not due to
negligence, the deterrent impact would be greater. Disclosure would deter 57% of patients from
suing and prompt 17% of patients to file suit.70 Based on these predictions, the researchers
estimated a 95% chance that the total claim volume would increase.71 Overall, then, disclosure
programs do not seem to reduce patients’ willingness to sue. However, such open
communication does seem to reduce patients’ level of anger, and so it may have some effect in
our equation for likelihood of a case going to trial.
The Legal System
In addition to the characteristics of the parties involved in a malpractice suit, some
attributes of the legal system itself may lead to poor fit. The official disclosure programs that I
just examined have ambiguous effects, but the desire for such programs reveals another
important explanation for the poor fit phenomenon: the asymmetrical information prior to a
lawsuit. Because patients lack full information about their injury prior to the discovery process,
they may inappropriately use the legal system. This is especially true because there is no other
means than the courts for patients to obtain compensation, regardless of the presence of
negligence. Additionally, poor fit may occur in the legal system because lawyers are generally
the ultimate decision-makers when determining which cases will go to trial, and they may have
different incentives and perspectives than patients.
The strong support among patients for full disclosure from doctors suggests that a large
reason that many patients sue is to gather information and receive explanations for the adverse
event they have experienced. The use of the court system to regulate medical malpractice has
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created a “catch 22,” in which doctors do not have an incentive to disclose information about an
adverse event to their patients because they fear being sued. However, this gives patients no way
outside of court to assess whether their doctor was negligent. Patients often do not have access
to other potential witnesses or to their own medical records, and they file lawsuits in order to
gain information during the discovery process.72 In this sense, poor fit (particularly the
mismatch component) is not necessarily evidence of “frivolous” lawsuits, as many critics of the
system allege, but rather a sorting process for legitimate claims because of asymmetrical
information.73
One indication that asymmetrical information leads to poor fit is the high rate of dropped
or settled cases. A study of approximately 1200 medical malpractice cases in North Carolina in
the late 1980s and early 1990s found that 40% were dropped and approximately half were settled
before trial.74 These statistics are consistent with the notion that patients who have become more
informed through the discovery process will drop their case if they find that negligence was
unlikely or settle for compensation if they find that negligence was likely.75 Cases are resolved
earlier in the process the more certain parties are, one way or the other, about the likelihood of
negligence.
If patients do not drop their cases or settle before trial, it is frequently because they still
lack enough information to appropriately determine the expected value of a verdict, and these
patients are largely unsuccessful in court. In a study of trial outcomes in California between
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1985 and 1986, only 29.2% of judgments were for the plaintiff.76 Prior to trial, 60.3% of cases
had a zero settlement offer, and only 23.7% of those cases received awards at trial.77 More
recent statistics about the nation’s 75 largest counties in 2001 also indicate only a 27% win rate
for plaintiffs.78 The low plaintiff success rate in medical malpractice cases reflects the fact that
asymmetry of information increases the likelihood of going to trial.79 Combined with the drop
rate, these statistics suggest that a sizable majority (perhaps as high as two-thirds)80 of
malpractice claims turn out to be meritless, corroborating the notion of poor fit.
Patients have a further incentive to use the court system to evaluate their case because
there are currently no other real means of obtaining compensation for injuries. There are some
examples of local “no-fault” compensation funds, such as the 3Rs program previously mentioned
as well as specific programs like Virginia’s Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Program, but these programs are limited. An expanded no-fault system would likely lead to
faster and potentially more equitable compensation without the transaction costs of the legal
system, potentially limiting some of the problems of poor fit.81 However, it would not
necessarily improve patient safety because it takes away the incentives to take appropriate care.
This entire chapter has assumed, in part for convenience, that patients are the primary
decision-makers when choosing whether to pursue a lawsuit, but in reality, lawyers act as the
gatekeepers for the legal system. Although plaintiffs can go to court sans counsel, this is rarely
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the case, largely because it requires an expert to navigate the complicated legal system.82 This in
itself may cause poor fit because the quality of legal representation among patients can vary and
some lawyers are worse than others at estimating expected values of verdicts,83 particularly if
they have limited experience with malpractice cases.84 The system also places patients at a
disadvantage because the attorneys for doctors are typically retained by their liability insurance
firm and are repeat players in the system.85 Lawyers may make more economically rational
decisions than patients when deciding whether to go to court, but they are also motivated by
factors other than negligence, primarily the potential amount of damages.
Like patients, attorneys typically estimate the economic impact of injuries and the
expected value of damages based on the severity of those injuries. Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically
operate on a contingency fee basis, meaning lawyers have a direct financial incentive to pursue
cases that will result in large damage awards. In the same study that analyzed phone calls to law
firms from potential plaintiffs, the researchers matched prospective calls with the attorneys’
dispositions of cases. Small recoverable damages (less than $50,000) were cited as one of the
primary reasons that attorneys rejected cases.86 Ultimately the attorneys retained only 3.3% of
the 730 calls initially received by the firms.87 The effects of reforms in the legal system also
demonstrate how attorneys are motivated by potential damages rather than actual negligence. A
study on the rate of tort filings in 19 states from 1984 to 1990 found that caps on non-economic
damages reduced the number of filings, while joint-and-several liability reforms (which
potentially increase the amount of damages a plaintiff may collect) increased the number of
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filings.88 This is significant because potential damages are not necessarily an indicator of the
presence of negligence, and this may account for some of the mismatch between actual
negligence and actual claims.
The phenomenon of poor fit illustrates that lawsuits are ineffective vehicles for enacting
patient safety policy because there are far fewer claims than negligent injuries and many of the
claims involve injuries not caused by negligence. These two components of a gap and a
mismatch in claims result from patients (and their lawyers) facing other incentives to sue or not
to sue. Low-income or low-status patient groups are less likely to pursue lawsuits, indicating
that a large group of patients are unrepresented in patient safety policy. The characteristics of
doctors and their relationships with patients may increase patients’ relative anger and willingness
to sue regardless of whether the patients’ injuries were caused by negligence. Both patients and
their lawyers may evaluate their cases based on the severity of patients’ injuries, which is
unrelated to whether those injuries were caused by negligence, and they may also use lawsuits to
evaluate cases in a world of asymmetrical information. All of these variables that are unrelated
to negligence mean that cases reach the court system that will not ultimately improve patient
safety, while other instances of actual negligence go unobserved. This shows that lawsuits,
which patients use for individual compensation, are not necessarily an effective public policy
tool.
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Chapter 4: The Unpredictability of Juries
I have shown that the dependence on individual initiative creates a poor fit between
actual negligence and actual malpractice suits, making lawsuits an inefficient tool for policy.
The deterrent signal of lawsuits is further distorted by the unpredictability of those cases that do
make it to trial. Medical malpractice is typically tried by civil jury, and the jury is charged with
determining a defendant’s liability and the amount of damages that he or she will pay. However,
I show that juries’ decisions about liability are often inaccurate because they are influenced by
extralegal factors, because there is error built into the court system, and because medical
malpractice cases are legally and scientifically complex. Juries’ decisions about damage awards
are unguided by the legal system and are thus often based on very different methods of
calculation. The result of inaccurate assessments of liability and widely varying damage awards
is that jury verdicts are highly unpredictable, which distorts the ability of lawsuits to signal to
doctors the appropriate level of care. Some evidence indicates that bench trials may be more
accurate and less time-consuming, and therefore less costly, than jury trials. However, the
inability of the justice system to send a deterrent signal through the jury trial suggests that
lawsuits are not the best means to improve patient safety.
Why Juries?
This chapter focuses on jury trials as a basis for evaluating all medical malpractice
lawsuits for both theoretical and practical reasons. The jury trial allows for the application of
society’s values and notions of justice. The extensive use of juries is, in modern society, a
uniquely American phenomenon. England has greatly reduced its use of jury trials since the
nineteenth century, and Canada uses them only sparingly and primarily in Ontario and British
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Columbia.1 Americans embedded the right to a trial by jury in the Constitution, however, and it
reflects the democratic philosophy of “rule by the people” by allowing a group of lay citizens,
rather than a single professional judge, to administer justice.2 In the realm of tort law, juries lie
at the intersection of substantive and procedural justice. They are responsible for effecting the
goals of the tort system, which are to prevent harm (deterrence) and to distribute risk
appropriately (compensation) while minimizing administrative costs and giving everyone his or
her “day in court.”3 By determining liability and damages, juries make the theory of the law real
for the parties involved in lawsuits. Thus juries are in one sense the physical embodiment of the
expectations for justice that I discussed in Chapter 2.
The research and statistics on trial verdicts that I analyze here do apply only to those
claims that actually go to trial. Out of the 50,000 to 60,000 malpractice claims raised annually,
only approximately 30% reach a trial.4 An older study of malpractice cases in Florida between
1985 and 1988 indicated that only 11.5% of claims were decided at verdict or on appeal. 5
Importantly for this chapter, however, research indicates that the cases that do go to trial are not
a random sample of all cases. A study of all malpractice claims filed in North Carolina between
1984 and 1987 found that the cases that typically went to trial were “borderline” ones that
involved questions of liability or unusual circumstances that might justify punitive damages.6
Therefore, my analysis of how juries affect the deterrent signal of malpractice is based on only a
1. Marc Galanter, “The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, University of Chicago Legal Forum 1990
(1990): 202.
2. George L. Priest, “The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation,” University of Chicago Legal
Forum 1990 (1990): 167.
3. James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll, and Daniel A. Relles, “Tort Standards and Jury Decisions,” Journal of
Legal Studies 14 (1985): 751.
4. Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert, “The Medical Malpractice System: Structure and Performance,” in
Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 13.
5. Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, “Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?”
Law and Society Review 24 (1990): 1005.
6. Thomas B. Metzloff, “Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury’s Shadow,” Law and Contemporary
Problems 54 (1991): 71.
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small portion of malpractice cases, but these cases were the ones that determined the substance
of the law.
While the small percentage of claims going to trial in itself might raise questions about
the ability of lawsuits to effect widespread patient safety policy, jury verdicts indirectly
determine plaintiffs’ willingness to sue and lawyers’ willingness to settle cases. Much of the
research on the workings of the legal system rests on the premise that jury trials form the tip of a
pyramid or iceberg and that the remainder of cases are settled “in the shadow” of expected jury
trial outcomes.7 As I showed in the previous chapter, patients who choose to sue base that
decision at least partially on the verdict and damages that they expect to receive. Furthermore,
especially in medical malpractice law, plaintiffs’ attorneys operate on a contingency fee basis.
They finance the costs of the trial upfront on the condition that they receive a percentage
(typically 35%) of the award. Therefore, attorneys base their decisions to represent a client, as
well as their decision to settle before trial and the amount of that settlement, on expected jury
damage awards. Defense attorneys and the insurance companies that hire them also base their
settlement decisions on expected jury verdicts. The effectiveness of jury trials, then, ultimately
determines the behavior of potential plaintiffs and defendants at all stages of litigation or
potential litigation.
In a medical malpractice trial, the jury determines whether a defendant medical
professional or institution is liable for the harm suffered by a patient and, if so, the amount of
damages to be paid. A doctor is found to be liable if he did not observe the standard of care of
the average, prudent provider in the given circumstances. While the standard for liability is
fairly straightforward, there is very little guidance provided to jurors on how to calculate
7. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, Avi Dor, and Chee Ruey Hsieh, “Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and
Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?” Law and Contemporary Problems 54 (1991): 916; Galanter, “Civil Jury,”
201.

56

damages. Jurors are simply instructed to make the winning plaintiff “whole” again, through a
combination of economic and noneconomic compensatory damages. They are also instructed
that punitive damages are warranted in the case of malicious or egregious harm. However,
juries’ evaluations of both liability and damages in malpractice cases are frequently inaccurate
and therefore unpredictable. Here I examine the factors external to and within the legal system
that foster this unpredictability and evaluate its impact on the deterrence function of lawsuits.
Liability
There are many factors that influence the decision-making process of jurors and that
prevent an accurate assessment of a defendant’s liability. Some of these factors can be termed
“human nature.” Jurors’ background characteristics as well as their individual attitudes and
beliefs influence to some extent their likelihood of finding a defendant liable. The psychology of
how jurors process information also affects their decision-making process. Jurors are also
influenced by the relative emotional appeal and persuasiveness of parties or their lawyers.
Verdicts can depend on how adept each side is at making use of these behavioral and
psychological traits. Finally, some factors that influence jurors are more inherent to the legal
system. Medical malpractice cases are complex both legally and scientifically, often making
determinations of liability hazy.
The selection of an impartial jury is a complicated process because the final verdict of a
jury depends at least in some part on the characteristics and beliefs of the jurors. Jurors are
selected from a pool of eligible citizens (typically compiled from the voter registration or driver
records in the state) called the venire. They are then questioned both generally and individually
by the judge or attorneys (depending on the rules of the precinct) during the voir dire for a
particular trial. The lawyers for each side may make challenges for cause, claiming that a
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particular juror has an individual conflict or bias in the case, or peremptory challenges, which
require no explanation. During this stage of the trial, lawyers for each side attempt to construct a
jury that they feel will rule in their favor, primarily based on the background characteristics and
the perceived beliefs and values of the potential jurors.
Jurors’ background characteristics can have an impact on whether or not a defendant will
be found liable. A mock jury trial study of 1000 jury-pool members found that those who were
minorities, had less education, had a lower income level, or were women were more likely to
find a defendant liable. Background characteristics together accounted for only 5.4% of the
variation in recommended verdicts,8 but these results do indicate that the determination of
negligence can be influenced by variables other than the facts of the case. These particular
characteristics are important in medical malpractice trials in particular because of the contrast
with the typical malpractice defendants. Doctors are highly educated and have higher incomes,
and this may inspire a sense of status conflict between jurors and defendants, although this effect
is more pronounced for damages than liability.
Jurors’ pre-standing beliefs about the legal system also have an impact on their
evaluation of liability. The same study found that those jurors who typically see plaintiffs in a
more favorable light, who think it is legitimate to sue, or who think it is normally difficult to win
a lawsuit, were more likely to find a defendant liable, although not to a large degree.9 These
characteristics suggest adherence to the cultural trend of litigiousness that I discussed in the
previous chapter, but these statistics do not necessarily indicate the prevalence of these beliefs.
Furthermore, the study only attained individual jurors’ recommended verdicts rather than
simulating the group setting of an actual trial. However, it does show that the specific
8. Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks, and Stephan Landsman, “Juror Judgments About Liability and
Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency,” DePaul Law Review 48 (1998): 306.
9. Ibid., 309.
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background and attitudinal characteristics of jurors on a panel can impact whether the defendant
will be found liable. This reveals that findings of liability would not be consistent across all
juries.
Cognitive psychology reveals other “human” elements that can affect juries’ finding of
liability, including information bias and the effect of vivid information. Jurors are presented
with an expanse of information at trial, but their preexisting knowledge of a topic will strongly
influence how they receive new information, often without their awareness. Jurors will be more
biased towards facts that confirm what they already know or think and against facts that
contradict their thoughts.10 A slightly different effect occurs because of the presentation of vivid
information, which is “concrete, sensory, and personally relevant information, [which] may have
a disproportionate impact on beliefs and inferences.”11 Vivid information at a trial may include
extreme testimony about how an injury was sustained or about the resulting consequences of an
injury. The effect of this vivid information may make jurors more likely to find a defendant
negligent if the damages are severe rather than mild. While severity of injury logically affects
the amount of damages, it should have no impact on the liability of the defendant. Both of these
psychological observations influence jurors without their realization and could result in different
determinations of liability from the same evidence if presented in different formats.
Jurors can similarly be influenced by the relative sympathetic appeal of the parties in a
case. A personally appealing or extraordinarily needy plaintiff may influence jurors’ willingness
to find a defendant liable, especially if they feel that the defendant can provide compensation,

10. Elizabeth F. Loftus and Lee Roy Beech, “Human Inference and Judgment: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half
Full?” Stanford Law Review 34 (1982): 947.
11. Ibid., 946.
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regardless of the defendant’s actual culpability.12 Savvy legal teams can make use of the
sympathetic nature of juries by presenting witnesses that make a good impression.13 The same
study of mock jurors referenced above found that even jurors who expressed trust in the
objectivity of experts were influenced more by an expert that was considered more appealing.14
Jury verdicts can thus be manipulated with “personnel” changes in a legal team or line-up of
witnesses. The combination of effects of personal characteristics, psychological traits, and
emotional appeals suggests that findings of liability are not consistent across juries and are
strongly affected by influences other than the facts of a case. This pattern distorts the deterrent
signal of lawsuits.
While the factors identified so far create variation in verdicts because of specific juries or
legal teams, there are also factors that are inherent to the legal system that can also affect jury
verdicts. The adversarial legal system in the United States functions by placing parties in
opposition to each other and allowing each to pursue his or her self-interest in a case. The judge
in the adversarial system serves not as a fact-finding figure but as a mediator, and both judges
and juries make their decisions based on which party has presented a more convincing case. In
addition to making use of emotional or psychological appeals, the lawyers for the plaintiff and
defense decide what information will even be presented in court. Therefore, juries may not make
their decisions with the full information available. This creates an inherent probability of error in
the legal system – both in finding liability where there is no negligence (Type I errors) and in

12. Edith Greene, “On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking,” Law and Contemporary
Problems 52 (1989): 233.
13. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, and James F. Blumstein, “Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
‘Pain and Suffering,’” Northwestern University Law Review 83 (1989): 36.
14. Diamond, Saks, and Landsman, “Juror Judgments,” 310.
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finding no liability where there is negligence (Type II errors).15 Having error like this built into
jury trials further precludes doctors from receiving a deterrent signal.
Medical malpractice cases are particularly susceptible to variation in jury verdicts
because they are both legally and scientifically more complex than other cases. Auto injury
cases are frequently used as the baseline for personal injury/negligence verdicts because they
typically involve a single theory of liability. Malpractice cases, in contrast, often involve
multiple theories of causation and liability because of the uncertainty of medical processes and
treatments.16 Additionally, medical malpractice cases involve complicated scientific and
statistical evidence. One study found that 82% of judges indicated that they sat in at least one
case they considered too complicated for the jury and that juries most frequently encountered
difficulty with the medical testimony in personal injury cases.17 The expert testimony in trials
often involves explanations of complex medical procedures or statistics about the likelihood of a
specific injury occurring. While experts who are trained to understand this information may
interpret it one way, lay people often respond differently, especially to statistics.18 Jurors are
presented with information about human physiology and anatomy, the diagnosis and treatment of
disease, and varying standards of care among physicians. Jurors may misunderstand how the
standard of care should be determined and applied in a case when they are presented with
conflicting expert testimony.19 Therefore, jurors with no medical or scientific background must
make decisions based on incomplete understanding or actual misunderstanding of the
15. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution,”
Journal of Economic Literature 27 (1989): 1087.
16. Neil Vidmar, “Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in
Medical Malpractice Cases,” Duke Law Journal 43 (1993): 232.
17. Jane Goodman, Edith Greene, and Elizabeth F. Loftus, “What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases: Judges and
Jurors Outline the Problem,” Trial 21 (1985): 65.
18. Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, “Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons
from Civil Jury Trials,” American University Law Review 40 (1991): 759.
19. Bryan A. Liang, “Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthesiology
Department,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 7 (1997): 124.
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circumstances of a case. The determination of liability in medical malpractice lawsuits, then, is
highly uncertain because of their legal and scientific complexity, in addition to being influenced
by numerous extralegal factors.
Damages
Establishing liability is only the first portion of the jury’s duties, and plaintiffs prevail in
approximately 30% of cases that go to trial.20 Juries must also determine the amount of the
damage award, and the average payout in 2003 was between $260,000 and $300,000.21 Jury
damage awards have been the subject of heated criticism in the public debate about malpractice
because they are perceived to be exponentially growing, and this is blamed for increasing
malpractice liability insurance premiums and increasing healthcare costs overall.22 In reality, the
pattern of jury awards is more like a two-tiered structure, with modest and relatively stable
awards in most cases but large and growing awards in a small subset of cases (the ones that are
widely publicized).23
Because the legal system provides no real guidance or conceptual rationale to jurors for
the amount of damages, the decisions of juries in determining awards are even more variable
than their decisions in determining liability. Jurors must create their own methods for
calculating monetary amounts, and they often take extralegal factors into account. In
compensatory damages, jury awards reflect vertical equity, meaning awards typically increase
with severity of injury, but horizontal inequity, meaning there is wide variability among
comparable injuries. Juries are even more haphazard when awarding noneconomic damages,

20. Mello and Studdert, “Medical Malpractice System,” 13.
21. Ibid.
22. David M. Studdert, Michelle S. Mello, and Troyen A. Brennan, “Medical Malpractice,” New England Journal of
Medicine 350 (2004): 283-292.
23. Galanter, “Civil Jury,” 217.
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such as those for pain and suffering, and punitive damages. There are several theories about how
juries arrive at damage amounts, and psychological studies also suggest that jurors are strongly
influenced by any suggested awards or caps placed on damages.
Like the assessment of liability, the calculation of damages can be affected by the
background characteristics of the jurors. In a study of 147 veniremen in Wake County (Raleigh),
North Carolina, when asked to recommend damage amounts in several scenarios, those who
were better educated tended to give smaller awards.24 This suggests that higher-educated jury
members either may empathize with higher-educated defendants or that they may take into
account the larger cost imposed on all of society by larger damage awards for defendants. More
importantly, however, this demonstrates variability among awards that has nothing to do with the
facts of the case.
Since the law does not specify a formula even for calculating compensatory damages,
jurors must choose which factors to take into account, and their calculations may be inaccurate if
they lack important information. Jurors often do lack pertinent information, such as the cost of
treating specific injuries.25 They must base their calculations of damages on the information
provided to them by the attorneys in the case. This can be one-sided if defendants’ attorneys do
not mention damages in their arguments for fear of implying an admission of liability. Jurors are
forced to make complicated guesses about the future – “‘How long will the pain last?’; ‘How
fully will the plaintiff recover?’; ‘How much will the dollar be worth in the future?’; ‘How
valuable will this child’s life be?’ – knowing that plaintiffs and defendants will have widely
diverging answers to these questions.26 In a survey of jurors about the factors they considered in
a hypothetical wrongful death suit, approximately 80% listed the decedent’s age, 90% the
24. Vidmar, “Deep Pockets Hypothesis,” 252.
25. Sloan and Hsieh, “Malpractice Payments,” 998.
26. Greene, “Juries and Damage Awards,” 227.
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decedent’s salary at time of death, and approximately 60% the decedent’s potential work life.27
Some jurors also took into consideration the impact of inflation or the attorney’s fees incurred
during the lawsuit. These so-called “silent” damages (another is the income taxes paid on
damage awards) are mentioned nowhere in the jury instructions but may factor into jurors’
calculations. While some or all of these factors may be worthy of inclusion in damage estimates,
the lack of guidance provided by the courts means that the considered factors vary in any given
case or with any given jury.
One factor that seems to consistently predict the amount of jury awards is the severity of
the injury, implying a high degree of “vertical” equity in awards. A study of jury findings in
Florida and Kansas City between 1973 and 1987 found that severity of injury (as measured on
the nine-point scale conventionally used in malpractice insurance cases) explained about twofifths of the variation in damage awards.28 This implies that the fairness between separate
degrees of injury is good. However, jury awards remain unpredictable because of “horizontal”
inequity.29 Although the mean and median in each category in the Florida/Kansas City study
were reasonable, the variation within each category seemed uncontrolled – “similar to anxiety
about drowning in a pool averaging only two feet in depth.”30 Despite the relative
correspondence of awards to injury levels, there is wide variability in awards for very similar
injuries.
Much of the variability in total award amounts results from the awarding of noneconomic
damages (pain and suffering) and/or punitive damages. Jurors, who are one-time players in the

27. Ibid., 237.
28. Bovbjerg et al., “Valuing Life and Limb,” 918, 923.
29. Michael J. Saks et al., “Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards,” Law and Human Behavior 21 (1997): 243.
30. Bovbjerg et al., “Valuing Life and Limb,” 924.
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legal system, are unable to value these amorphous damages consistently over time.31 The
cognitive strategy that jurors use to attempt to assess punitive damages is to first judge the
“egregiousness, reprehensibility, or punishability of the defendant’s conduct,” and then to
translate that level into a dollar value.32 This conversion of internal judgments into numerical
levels can obviously lead to large, arbitrary differences among individuals, whose internal and
external value scales do not necessarily align.33 Additionally, punitive damages are meant both
to punish the current action and to deter future similar harms. However, jurors tend to
understand better and value more the punishment role of damages than the deterrent role. In one
study of 174 jury-eligible adults in Reno, Nevada, jurors were 1.5 times more likely to identify
punishment than deterrence as their motive.34 This misunderstanding of the nature of punitive
damages, in addition to the ambiguous nature of both punitive and noneconomic damages,
naturally leads to widely varying awards among juries for substantially similar injuries.
Efforts to understand how juries do evaluate punitive damages have revealed three
potential bases: the amount of the compensatory damages, the defendant’s financial status,
and/or the amount requested by the plaintiff in the ad damnum.35 The use of some multiple of
the compensatory damages was popular among the jurors in another study of mock-jurors in
Reno. Some jurors multiplied the compensatory damages by two, and others used multipliers
ranging from .5 to 3.36 This strategy, while offering some degree of mathematical certainty, fails
to reflect the true purpose of punitive damages, which should not correlate to the actual harm
caused to the plaintiff but rather to the extent of the defendant’s egregious behavior. This use of

31. Metzloff, “Resolving Malpractice Disputes,” 44.
32. Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, and John W. Payne, “Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s
Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards,” Law and Human Behavior 23 (1999): 448.
33. Ibid., 449.
34. Ibid., 457.
35. Ibid., 463.
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improvised formulae unrelated to the appropriate amount of punitive damages only increases the
variability of damage awards.
The second theory – using a calculation based on the defendant’s ability to pay –
corresponds with what is called the “deep-pockets” hypothesis or alternatively the “wealth
redistribution” hypothesis. The wealth redistribution hypothesis implies that juries take into
account both a defendant’s comparative wealth (“deep pockets”) and a plaintiff’s comparative
poverty (“empty pockets”) when establishing a monetary award.37 There is some evidence to
suggest that jury awards are influenced by the financial status of the defendant, including
doctors. In the case of malpractice, jurors may levy larger damages against doctors both because
doctors are heavily insured and wealthier than many other defendants but also because of the
special level of trust that patients place in their doctors.38 A study of over 9,000 cases closed in
Cook County, Illinois, between 1960 and 1979 revealed that medical malpractice awards against
doctors were almost 2.5 times as large as awards against other individuals in average case types,
and awards against hospitals were 85% larger.39 Again, these awards also impact parties’
expectations and willingness to settle before trial. Inflated damage awards in jury trials thus
have a trickle-down effect on the behavior of all potential plaintiffs and defendants.
Finally, the use of the amount requested by the plaintiff reflects a larger psychological
pattern of anchoring awards to dollar amounts named during trials. This is relevant both in cases
where plaintiffs request a specific amount and in many tort reform policies that include caps on
economic and/or noneconomic damages. In social psychological theory, an anchor is a position,
along a continuum of responses to a dilemma, that has been given context or a frame of

37. Ibid., 449.
38. Hammitt, Carroll, and Relles, “Tort Standards,” 756.
39. Ibid., 754.
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reference.40 Assimilation is the movement of the individual’s response toward the anchor.41 In
part this occurs because it reduces the burden of processing information and making a decision.42
This is especially true when individuals have no preconceived frame of reference for the decision
they are making.43
In the case of the ad damnum or of a damage cap, the monetary amount named acts as an
anchor that will draw jury awards toward the given level, especially because jurors typically
have no preconceived frame of reference for the appropriate amount of damages. One study
requesting mock jurors to name a pain and suffering award resulted in a mean award of $100,000
for all jurors but a significantly higher mean award for those jurors who heard an ad damnum
request of $250,000.44 Likewise, in an interview portion of the University of Chicago Jury
Project, jurors in six out of the seven personal injury cases in which the plaintiff prevailed
reported that damages were determined at least in part with reference to the ad damnum.45 The
psychological phenomenon of anchoring indicates that the amount of damages awarded by juries
will be highly variable because of its dependence on the amount named by the plaintiff during
trial.
The concept of anchoring has important implications for tort reforms that include caps on
economic or noneconomic damages because it demonstrates the importance of the actual amount
of the cap. Several studies show how jurors’ awards assimilate to caps, which serve as part of
the context around which they formulate their decision about damages. In one study, the median
total award in a hypothetical double wrongful death case was $37,500; with a cap of $2 million,
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the median award rose to $775,000; and with a cap of $20 million, the median rose to $1
million.46 The caps in this case served as anchors that drew the jury’s award upward from a
much lower unanchored award. Damage caps ultimately may give windfalls to those with lesser
injuries by drawing their awards upward, while potentially depriving those with serious injuries
(the costs of which could exceed the cap) of full compensation.47 Particularly with injuries of
low or moderate severity, the study also found that caps increased the variability of awards.48
Naming specific monetary amounts, either through plaintiff requests or through state-imposed
damage caps, anchors jury awards to amounts that may be arbitrary and thus ultimately increases
their size and variability.
Predictability and Implications
These observations on the many extralegal factors that influence juries’ determinations of
liability and damages are important ultimately not because they may be inaccurate but because
they are unpredictable. The personal and psychological characteristics that make juries
malleable and the intricacies of medicine and the law that make medical malpractice cases
difficult to comprehend influence doctors’ estimated liability in largely unpredictable ways.
Moreover, the lack of guidance for juries in determining damages and their resulting use of
improvised methods of calculation (particularly for noneconomic and punitive damages) have
also meant that damage awards are highly unpredictable. When doctors and their insurance
companies cannot accurately predict verdicts, the deterrent function of lawsuits fails. One result
of this may be defensive medicine, the over- or under-provision of medical services due to
doctors’ fear of malpractice lawsuits. Other implications of the unpredictability of jury trials are
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a lack of fairness, an erosion of confidence in justice, and increased expense of the entire
malpractice system. Bench trials may superficially improve some of these deficiencies, but the
problem is ultimately that lawsuits, a means of individual justice, are not the best tool for
encouraging doctors to improve patient safety.
The inability of doctors and insurers to predict the outcome of jury trials, which are the
flagship of the malpractice system, has been demonstrated in several studies. A North Carolina
study comparing jury damage awards with insurance companies’ pretrial predictions showed that
awards were rarely within the companies’ estimated ranges.49 While sometimes awards were
higher than expectations and other times they were lower, their predictability was severely
questioned. Similarly, in a study of the anesthesiology department at a primary teaching hospital
of Harvard Medical School, physicians were asked to evaluate a series of medical malpractice
cases for medical errors and then to predict the jury’s verdict in each cases.50 The physicians
predicted the verdicts correctly only 57% of the time, a statistically significant result. For cases
in which the majority of physicians indicated that they could not tell whether there was medical
negligence, the physicians correctly picked the actual jury verdicts only 55% of the time.
Doctors’ (and their insurance companies’) ability to understand when juries will find them
negligent (i.e. what the legal standard of care is) is necessary for the deterrent signal of lawsuits
to function.
Predictability is, in fact, more important than accuracy for the effectiveness of deterrence
because doctors must be able to change their behavior before errors occur. The standard of care
establishes the level of patient safety that the community deems acceptable as that level of care at
which the reasonably prudent physician acts. In order for lawsuits to encourage this level of
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patient safety, both jurors and doctors must know and make use of the same standard of care
when evaluating doctors’ behavior. If physicians believe that some of the actions they deem
medically appropriate will coincide with jury verdicts while others do not, they will not be able
to determine what their actions should be in a given scenario, and, if they are risk-averse, they
will overestimate the probability of being sued and found liable.51
Doctors who overestimate the likelihood of being sued will often practice defensive
medicine, which exhibits as either assurance behaviors (taking too many costly precautions) or
avoidance behaviors (withdrawal from risky activities). The over-provision of care results in
higher costs both directly in paying for the additional services and indirectly by increasing
patients’ risk of additional iatrogenic injury.52 The under-provision of care can harm patients
when they are unable to access care.53 Anecdotal evidence of defensive medicine during the
insurance crisis of the 1980s included obstetricians reportedly refusing to deliver babies.54 A
study in Pennsylvania, a state known for its high malpractice liability insurance premiums, took a
random sample of doctors in six high-risk specialties. In examples of assurance behaviors, 59%
of the physicians reported often ordering more tests than were medically indicated; 52% reported
often referring patients to other specialists in unnecessary circumstances; 33% reported often
prescribing more medications than medically indicated, and 32% reported suggesting invasive
procedures in clinically inappropriate circumstances.55 Examples of avoidance behavior were
that 32% of the doctors reported forgoing certain kinds of procedures and interventions, and 39%
reported avoiding high-risk patients.56 Additionally, about 4% reported that they would

51. Ibid., 144.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., 145.
54. Bovbjerg et al., “Juries and Justice,” 925.
55. Troyen A. Brennan, Michelle M. Mello, and David M. Studdert, “Liability, Patient Safety, and Defensive
Medicine: What Does the Future Hold?” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 105.
56. Ibid.

70

definitely relocate out of Pennsylvania because of professional liability insurance; 7% planned to
retire early; and 43% had personally reduced or eliminated high-risk aspects of their practice.57
Even if the results of this study are an overestimate or cannot be generalized to other parts of the
country, they do reveal doctors’ fear of the uncertainty of the medical malpractice system.
Because lawsuits do not send a consistent signal about the standard of care to which doctors
should conform their behavior, doctors are forced to guess and often guess inaccurately.
While the deterrent function of lawsuits is my primary focus in this thesis, there are other
implications of fairness, justice, and cost that result from the unpredictable nature of jury trials.
First, notions of fairness operate on an individual level in the justice system. While jury verdicts
may exhibit vertical equity by reflecting severity of injury on average, the horizontal inequity
that results in widely varying verdicts for similar injuries has large consequences for the
individuals whose suits are valued so differently.58 Corresponding to this sense of individual
fairness in the court system is people’s sense of justice in their larger society. When the courts
are used to compensate monetarily individuals for injuries, the inequalities among verdicts are
magnified by external players, such as insurance companies and medical providers.59 Finally,
the unpredictability of jury trials only exacerbates the high costs of the litigation system. Some
estimates of the administrative costs of compensating medical malpractice victims through the
court system are as high as fifty cents out of every dollar.60 Lawsuits are initiated by individuals
and tried individually, and therefore each case of medical malpractice involves new start-up
costs. Furthermore, the more variable each side’s expectations about a potential jury verdict, the
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more likely they are to go to trial rather than to settle out of court.61 More than twice the
proportion (11% versus 5%) of medical malpractice suits go to trial than other types of personal
injury cases, and this is largely due to the huge variations in jury awards that make it difficult for
parties to find room for compromise and settlement.62 Unpredictable jury awards also raise the
costs of the healthcare system in general by raising malpractice liability insurance premiums.63
Evidence indicates that physicians pass on the increase in their own insurance premiums by
raising fee levels, essentially covering 100%+ of their own cost increase.64 The unpredictable
nature of jury trials thus has an effect on multiple aspects of the medical and legal systems,
ultimately raising the costs of both systems.
Some of the problems created by jury trials could be resolved through the use of bench
trials, which might increase predictability and lower costs. Having a judge rather than a jury
decide medical malpractice trials could increase the predictability of verdicts by using a
professional decision-maker, who sits continuously and whose opinions could have a more direct
effect on future verdicts.65 The increased predictability would encourage more out-of-court
settlements, thereby lowering the administrative costs of the system. However, one study found
that judges and juries agreed on liability in 79% of cases, suggesting that the improvements in
predictability would be small.66 The University of Chicago Jury Project also found (by
controlling for the number of witnesses and by surveying trial judges and lawyers) that bench
trials are on average 40% less time-consuming than jury trials.67 This reduction in trial time
would further reduce the administrative costs of the system. Finally, the social costs of the
61. Ibid., Sloan, and Blumstein, “Valuing Life and Limb,” 11.
62. Paul C. Weiler, “Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform,” Rutgers Law Review 47
(1995): 1163.
63. Bovbjerg et al., “Juries and Justice,” 926.
64. Mark V. Pauly, “Who Pays When Malpractice Premiums Rise?” in Sage and Kersh, Medical Malpractice, 77.
65. Priest, “Role of the Civil Jury,” 199.
66. Galanter, “Civil Jury,” 218.
67. Ibid.
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system would decrease because judges typically assign lower damage awards than do juries. In a
study of the tort dispositions in 24 metropolitan trial courts for one month in 1988, the median
bench award was $8500 while the median jury award was $26,500.68 This does reflect in some
part a selection bias, but other studies have compared the hypothetical verdicts of judges and
juries in the same cases. In the same study comparing judge and jury verdicts, jury awards
averaged 20% higher than judges’ awards, and in 52% of the cases in which the judge and jury
agreed that the defendant was liable, the jury awarded more in damages.69 The primary benefit
of bench trials, then, is a streamlined version of the jury trial that slightly improves the
predictability of verdicts.
Ultimately the ineffectiveness of the deterrent signal in medical malpractice lawsuits is a
result of using an individual means of justice for public policy ends. Deterrence requires that
determinations of liability and damages be predictable over time and space, but each medical
malpractice trial is a new event. While some parties may be repeat players (such as judges and
attorneys), each case involves new circumstances that are heard and evaluated by a new jury of
lay citizens. This system is adequate, and even beneficial, for resolving disputes between
individuals. However, it lacks the ability to send a consistent signal of the appropriate standard
of care to which doctors will be held accountable.

68. Ibid.
69. Greene, “Juries and Damage Awards,” 228.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
When an adverse event occurs – such as Dr. Thompson’s decision to wait to intubate
Mrs. Wilson – it is highly traumatic for the individuals involved. Mrs. Wilson’s family was
angry, afraid, and unsure about what had happened to their loved one. The wanted somebody to
pay for what had happened – in terms of both financial compensation and retributive
punishment. They filed a lawsuit against Dr. Thompson because they, as individuals, placed
blame on another individual for the unique circumstances surrounding Mrs. Wilson’s injury.
The courts are designed to deal with cases such as Mrs. Wilson’s at the individual level.
They in fact thrive off of the unique details of individual cases,1 as the common law system
operates by drawing parallels and making distinctions with past precedent. I have looked at
medical malpractice litigation from a social perspective, however, through the lens of deterrence
theory. Using liability to encourage doctors to improve patient safety ultimately turns the courts
into policy-makers of sorts. This is a concept Robert Kagan refers to as “adversarial legalism,”
and which he defines as “policy-making, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means
of lawyer-dominated litigation.”2 I have used medical malpractice as a kind of case study for
whether deterrence theory holds and, more generally, whether the courts are capable of
effectively making policy. As a case study, it shows both the cultural rationale for using lawsuits
for policy-making as well as the individualized nature of lawsuits, which make them poor
implements of policy-making.
The historical development of medical malpractice litigation encapsulates the
development of the larger culture of litigiousness in America. The nineteenth century saw a rise

1. Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977), 33.
2. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2001), 3.
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in the number of medical malpractice lawsuits as it became increasingly acceptable to sue other
people. One component of this litigiousness was a shift in the nature of American individualism.
The Industrial Revolution brought urbanization and with it a decline in traditional communities.
Although urbanization brings people within closer physical proximity, it increases the relational
distance and makes people highly dependent on strangers. Dispute resolution with strangers
required some sort of external arbitration, and people turned to the courts. Increased
individualism also corresponded with a decreased respect for authority, which manifested in a
greater willingness to challenge authority figures such as doctors. A second component of the
increasingly litigious culture was increased expectations for justice. This was in part a new
willingness to blame other people, a change from the former belief in divine providence. It also
reflected the new ability of technology to control the environment, and in this regard, medical
malpractice was a prime example. Science and technology opened up new possibilities for
success in medicine, which increased people’s expectations and thereby increased doctors’
potential liability.
All of these cultural changes made people more willing to sue, which ultimately made the
courts a viable option for policy-making. The combination of increased individualism and
greater expectations for justice created a new role for the courts as the protectors of individual
rights. In the realm of medical malpractice, this came about with the patients’ rights movement,
which mirrored the larger rights movements and consumer movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
People turned to the courts to define and enforce these individual rights and thus acknowledged
the role of the courts as policy-makers. This type of policy-making through litigation
(“adversarial legalism”) is in many ways uniquely American, and it reflects the tension in
American political culture between a desire for government protection of individual rights and
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distaste of large government structures. Individual rights were an important segue into the use of
courts as policy-makers, however, because they emphasize the very individual nature of the
courts.3
My case study of deterrence theory and medical malpractice emphasizes the
individualized nature of the courts and demonstrates their weaknesses as policy-makers. The
first relevant aspect of the legal system is that cases are individually initiated. Donald Horowitz
calls this the “passivity of the judicial process,” and he argues that it has two important
consequences on policy-making.4 First, even though the courts are the “policy-makers” in
litigation, they must rely on the timing and whims of the individual litigants. Second, judicial
policy-making becomes a “chance occurrence,” with no guarantee that the cases that come
before the courts are representative of the problem they purport to represent. This is the problem
of extrapolating policy from the unique characteristics of individual cases. In medical
malpractice, this is the problem of poor fit. This simultaneous gap and mismatch between actual
negligence and actual claims shows how dependent patient safety policy is on the details of
individual cases. The characteristics of patients and doctors and the quality of the doctor-patient
relationship all change a patient’s relative anger towards a doctor and his or her willingness to
sue. Additionally, patients and their lawyers may base their decision to sue on the severity of the
injury rather than the doctor’s negligence, and they may use the legal system to be able to gather
more information about the incident. All of these factors prevent medical malpractice lawsuits
from sending a consistent signal to doctors about their likelihood of being sued or, through this,
the appropriate level of care they should take.

3. Horowitz, Courts and Social Policy, 34.
4. Ibid., 38.
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A second highly individualized aspect of the legal system is the unpredictable nature of
jury trials. Juries are responsible for determining the liability and damages in the vast majority
of medical malpractice cases that go to trial, and these cases in turn affect the decisions of other
potential plaintiffs and defendants. When determining doctors’ liability, juries are often
influenced by their own background characteristics and by their preexisting beliefs about the
circumstances in a case or the legal system in general. Additionally, basic human psychological
traits, such as the relative emotional appeal of each party or the vividness of information
presented, can sway jurors’ opinions. Finally, medical malpractice trials require jurors to sort
through complicated legal and medical information that they may not understand. When
estimating damages, jurors must make calculations with no real guidelines from the court.
Although awards reflect vertical equity (increasing as the severity of injury increases), they vary
widely horizontally, making them largely unpredictable. Jurors’ estimates of noneconomic
damages may reflect the amount of economic damages or may reflect an amount named by the
plaintiff or mentioned in a damage cap, demonstrating the psychological effect of anchoring.
While bench trials may eliminate some of the unpredictability of jury trials, these effects are
probably limited. This unpredictability can have huge effects on the costs of medical
malpractice litigation as well as on its fairness and justice, and these effects all bring into
question the effectiveness of policy implemented by the courts.
Both of the major problems that I identify with medical malpractice trials – the poor fit
phenomenon and the unpredictability of juries – relate to the fact that lawsuits are tools for
individual dispute resolution. The use of the courts as makers of policy about patient safety
depends on deterrence theory. In order for deterrence theory to hold, doctors must receive a
consistent signal about when they will be held liable so that they can maintain the appropriate
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level of care. Consistency over time (i.e. predictability) is the key element here – it is what
makes policy public rather than individual. Therefore, the very nature of the lawsuit makes it
inappropriate for implementing policy on a large scale.
When combined with some of the theoretical or philosophical arguments against using
the courts as policy-makers, this evidence presents a clear case against using the courts as policymakers. One of the reasons that Americans turned to using the courts was an inherent opposition
to unaccountable government authority. The judicial branch was created coequal to the other
two branches as part of a system of checks and balances on the government’s power. Americans
have enshrined the notion of individual rights, both in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and
in a market economy that depends on the self-interested behaviors of individual actors.5 In such
a political system, however, there should be more fear of allowing the courts to incrementally
create policy without any real check on its authority.6 Americans have blurred the distinction
between the responsibilities of the different branches of government by allowing litigation to
serve as regulation.7
Some of the other methods for dealing with medical malpractice and regulating patient
safety, although currently only local and voluntary, suggest better routes for public policy. First,
patient safety change needs to happen at the systems level. Hospital review boards recognize
this, and they compile data to learn what behavior changes can be accomplished from the top
down. For example, until the mid-1980s, there were many intraoperative injuries and deaths
caused when an oxygen tube bent and cut off oxygen supply to the brain. After operating rooms
began installing alarms on the blood oxygen level monitor, the number of accidents dropped
5. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 2.
6. Horowitz, Courts and Social Policy, 35.
7. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation (Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, 2002), 1.
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threefold.8 Changes such as this one can alter patterns of human behavior that typically lead to
error and thereby increase patient safety without incorporating litigation. Policy relating to
patient safety cannot ignore the consequences of errors that do occur, and there needs to be some
sort of compensation for patients who suffer from adverse events. Although some of the no-fault
compensation schemes that currently exist are not financially sound, they do show promise in
limited capacities.
Ultimately, broad changes to the current system are not going to be politically feasible, at
least in the short term. However, some things can be done to improve the problems of poor fit
and unpredictable juries that I have addressed. Policies such as “I’m sorry” statutes or opendisclosure programs that allow for improved doctor-patient communication without necessarily
placing doctors at greater risk of liability may reduce litigation or at least reduce some of the
mismatch between actual negligence and claims. The mismatch could likewise be improved by
implementing pretrial screening panels of experts. Within the legal system, some things could be
done to reduce the unpredictability of trials by shifting away from jury trials. Although this may
be politically unfeasible, courts could provide better guidance for juries when determining
liability and negligence. Another option is court-appointed expert witnesses that could provide
an opinion on the complex medical and legal scenarios without the bias of either party. All of
these policy alternatives begin to address some of the problems with using the courts to improve
patient safety, and they provide some starting points for further exploration of the topic.
The litigious culture in America has created a system in which we use individual court
cases to try to implement policy on a grand scale. The very individual aspects of these cases,
however, make them inappropriate for this purpose. In medical malpractice, this use of

8. John H. Eichhorn, “Prevention of Intraoperative Anesthesia Accidents and Related Severe Injury Through Safety
Monitory,” Anesthesiology 70 (1989): 572.
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adversarial legalism creates policy that is unfair and inconsistent for both doctors and patients in
situations that really are “life or death.” The courts are not only inefficient, but they also act
largely without accountability, and this makes the problems with their policies even more
egregious. Medical malpractice exemplifies what not to do in public policy-making, and it is an
issue that deserves change.
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